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The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a three-pillar document that was unanimously 
approved and adopted at the 2005 World Summit Meeting by members of the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to serve as a guideline for addressing mass atrocity 
crimes. The research problem concerned the successful implementation of the third pillar, 
a key fixture of R2P, which allows the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to use 
forceful measures, as a last resort to address mass atrocity crimes. However, a climate of 
division within the UNSC has led to inaction. Using the R2P doctrine as a theoretical 
framework, the purpose of this qualitative case study was to examine the third pillar, in 
crisis related situations, such as Syria beginning in 2012. The research questions 
addressed the application of the third pillar in crisis related situations involving mass 
atrocity crimes, specifically in Syria. This study used a qualitative case study framework 
to collect, examine, and analyze secondary data on R2P. This data was coded using a 
descriptive coding strategy, where similar words, phrases, and ideological beliefs were 
analyzed and developed into major themes for synthesis and analysis. The results found 
an inconsistent application of the third pillar, resulting in policy inaction, and even failure 
of public administration to achieve consensus within the UNSC. The implications for 
positive social change include recommendations for procedures on successfully 
implementing the third pillar, if the UNSC fails to act. The potential public policy 
modification would allow victims of mass atrocities crimes the opportunity to achieve 
safety and security, in accordance with the United Nations (UN) Charter’s common 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study  
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a three-pillared document that emerged 
from the World Summit meeting in 2005 within the United Nations. The R2P is a 
guideline for protecting civilians in failed or failing states. The R2P doctrine united the 
member states in the United Nations by declaring that “all state governments have a 
responsibility/obligation to protect their own populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity” (Gholiagha, 2015, p. 1074). After the 
tragedies in Rwanda and Kosovo, Kofi Annan—then acting Secretary-General—issued a 
challenge to the member states of the United Nations stating that “humanitarian 
interventions are unacceptable and considered a knock-on sovereignty” and questioning 
how the UN should “respond to mass atrocities, particularly after the failings of the 
UNSC [United Nations Security Council] in Rwanda and Kosovo?” (UN Department of 
Public Information, 2012, p. 1). In 2001, in response to Annan, the Canadian government 
created the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), 
which established the guidelines previously mentioned for protecting the citizens of 
member states (ICISS, 2001). In 2004, Annan endorsed the “emerging norm of R2P” 
through the panel on High-Level Threats, Challenges and Change (UN Department of 
Public Information, 2012, p. 1). Annan acknowledged the existence of a collective 
international responsibility and posited that the UNSC should be an authoritative body 
only as a last resort, if mass atrocities have occurred and a state has failed in its 
responsibility to protect its citizens, either willingly or unwillingly. The panel identified 
some basic criteria to legitimately authorize the use of force by the UNSC: (a) the 




Department of Public Information, 2012). Additionally, all member states accepted the 
principles of R2P and agreed that if a state has manifestly failed to meet their 
responsibilities, then all states (i.e., the international community) have the responsibility 
to protect these people threaten by mass atrocity crimes when all peaceful means have 
been exhausted. In 2012, Syria eventually met the criteria of a failed state according to 
the three pillars of R2P. Additionally, after exhausting all peaceful means (i.e., 
diplomatic and humanitarian), the international community, via the UNSC and in 
accordance with the UN Charter (1945), should have acted collectively in a “timely and 
decisive manner” at the beginning of this crisis (p. 2). 
According to the UN Security Council (2011), the three pillars of R2P are as 
follows:  
1. The State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations 
from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing, 
and their incitement. 
2. The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist 
States in fulfilling this responsibility. 
3. The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate 
diplomatic, Humanitarian, and other means to protect populations from 
these crimes. If a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the 
international community must be prepared to take collective action to 
protect populations, in accordance with the UN Charter. (pp. 3–4) 
In this study, the researcher analyzed the implementation of Pillar 3—the use of force 




implementation of Pillar 3 was the most contested principle of the R2P doctrine during 
the Syrian crisis. The Russians and the Chinese used their veto power to block all 
resolutions proposed by the West on Syria (Grover, 2015). Grover suggested that this 
gamesmanship was a stall tactic on the use of force, where no peaceful means were an 
option. Kolmašová (2016) further explained that a lack of consensus on what constituted 
an adequate response, as well as limited prospects of a successful outcome, have 
prevented an international response to the humanitarian crisis in Syria. The UNSC was 
polarized along ideological lines, the permanent three (i.e., United States, United 
Kingdom, and France) versus the permanent two (i.e., Russia and China), could not 
achieve a vote of consensus, especially after the Libyan experience. After analyzing the 
intervention in Libya, Kolmašová concluded that the Libyan case had two fundamental 
differences from the Syrian case: (a) no national/strategic interests by China and Russia; 
where the Russians and Chinese challenged the West on what they believed to be regime 
change; and (b) no regional support for the Gaddafi regime. If Pillar 3 were to have 
legitimacy and legality, one of the main criteria was to achieve consensus by the 
permanent five members (P5) within the UNSC: The United States, United Kingdom, 
France, China, and Russia. The UNSC needed to act in a collective manner to maintain 
peace and security. All other member states rotate on the UNSC; however, they did not 
have permanent statuses, and thus have no veto power. Coen (2015) noted that invoking 
Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine required that all permanent members, either through 
abstinence or actively voting for implementation, agreed on the merits of the intervention. 
Although consensus was achieved in the Libyan crisis of 2011, but consensus on the use 




was paralyzed in adopting a resolution because Russia and China issued a veto. 
Nevertheless, R2P is the doctrine promoted within the international community as the 
guideline for intervening to protect civilians at risk for mass atrocity crimes and crimes 
against humanity. 
At the World Summit in 2005, the UN universally recognized the need to respond 
collectively to crises involving mass atrocities. The R2P doctrine emerged as a guideline 
for the UN to respond collectively to crises that threatened the international peace and 
security. There were four problem areas addressed by the outcome document: (a) 
sustainable development (social, economic, and other related fields), (b) peace and 
collective security, (c) human rights and the rule of law, and (d) strengthening of the UN 
by enhancing its authority to respond to the challenges of time. Peace and collective 
security, part of the common purposes of the UN Charter, are at the core of the R2P 
doctrine. S. W. Lee (2012) explained: 
R2P is not just one concept, but rather a cluster of ideas centered upon a sovereign 
states’ responsibility to protect its people. (a) Each state has a responsibility to 
protect its citizens (pillar one); (b) The international community has an obligation 
to ensure states honor this responsibility (pillar two); and (c) If a state manifestly 
fails in their duties, the international community may use all necessary means to 
provide this protection (pillar three). (p. 252) 
Furthermore, the stated shared interests of the UN Charter (1945) showed the need for 
maintaining international peace and security. Chapter 1 of the UN Charter explains the 
“common purposes and interests” of the UN, and the common theme is to maintain peace 




the UN fulfilled its obligations under the UN Charter (1945) to maintain peace and 
security within the international community. Given the historical dynamics of 
international relations, the state is looked upon as having exclusive rights to sovereignty. 
Due to the R2P dynamic of focusing on fundamental human rights as being sovereign, 
rising complexities have hindered the implementation of Pillar 3 in most of the ongoing 
global crises. 
The current system of international relations has defined the world in terms of 
nation-states consisting of borders, although it is the people that make up these nation-
states, which the R2P doctrine is primarily concerned. The R2P doctrine challenged state 
sovereignty as the central focus in international relations, shifting the focus to the 
individual. T. H. Lee (2014) explained that the purpose of R2P is to undermine the 
principle of exclusive sovereignty and the notion that no other state has the right or 
responsibility to interfere in how it treats its people, especially by force. Individual rights, 
particularly basic human rights, should not be minimized by the notion of state 
sovereignty. Power—specifically within the international realm of “Real Politiks”—
obscures any challenges to state sovereignty, even if it means capitulation to mass human 
atrocities. Grover (2015) explained: 
At what point those human rights violations (threatened or actual) are egregious 
enough to warrant UN Security Council involvement via the use of authorized 
threats of or use of force to prevent and/or end such international atrocity crimes 
is of course very much colored by political and strategic State interests. Hence, as 




mass atrocities of varying scales in diverse States on more than one continent. (p. 
1115) 
The literature showed evidence of the international community’s acceptance of the R2P 
doctrine. The R2P emerged from the 2005 World Summit, where leaders of all member 
states formally accepted the concept of protecting their populations from the four core 
crimes against humanity (UN General Assembly, 2005). In addition, if a state manifestly 
fails to provide protection and other means do not appear to render a peaceful solution, 
then the international community should act collectively in a timely, decisive manner to 
use all available means to protect the civilian population in question (UN General 
Assembly, 2005). 
The research demonstrated that a gap exists in the literature on the policies and 
procedures to implement Pillar 3 when the UNSC failed to achieve consensus on using 
force to protect civilian populations from failed nation-states. This allows the pain and 
suffering of civilian populations, such as in Syria, to continue. Bellamy and Williams 
(2006) cited a lack of appropriate and tested military doctrine on how to perform the 
tasks of civilian protection. Libya is the only case on record where the international 
community has agreed to use force collectively to protect—thereby intervening 
militarily—in a state with a functioning legitimate government. T. H. Lee (2014) 
explained that traditionally, nation-state leaders would only intervene on behalf of their 
own citizens or the citizens of their allies, within another country's sovereign territory. 
The emergence of R2P, along with the increase in states failing to meet the criteria of 
providing safety and security to their citizens, the implementation of Pillar 3 emerged as 




theoretically, should prevent further suffering and mass loss of life in most crisis-related 
situations, such as Syria.  
Through an exhaustive review of the literature, this researcher discovered a gap 
which promoted the implementation of Pillar 3 to bring safety and security to civilians 
when a crisis has reached an impossible conclusion, such as in Syria. This researcher 
examined Pillar 3—the collective use of force—of the R2P doctrine by using the Syrian 
crisis as a case study, while briefly comparing the Libyan case, in the context of the 
research. Additionally, the researcher expanded on the literature seeking to protect 
civilians, based on the common purposes and principles of the UN Charter. Also, the 
researcher expanded on the literature of the R2P doctrine, which promotes the protection 
of fundamental human rights. 
In the following sections, the researcher discusses the background of the Syrian 
crisis and the inability of the UNSC to reach a consensus implementing R2P, as well as 
previous research on the doctrine. Additionally, the researcher presents the study’s 
research questions, as well as the procedures for data collection and data analysis. 
Finally, the researcher provides a discussion on the study’s implications for positive 
social change to conclude the chapter.  
Background 
The R2P evolved from the concept of human security and humanitarian 
intervention. In 2005, Secretary-General Kofi Annan approved of this emerging norm, 
explaining a collective international responsibility remained to intervene—if necessary, 
militarily—to protect civilians when a state has failed in its duties to do the same (UN 




for addressing crimes against humanity and mass atrocities, stressing the need to maintain 
peace and security. Nuruzzaman (2013) stated that the theoretical significance of the R2P 
doctrine lies in initiating a change in basic assumptions from the right of intervention to 
an obligation to intervene.  
The literature exposed a conflict among many researchers’ interpretations of Pillar 
3 of the R2P doctrine. For example, Berti (2014) questioned whether the true principles 
of R2P were rooted in the decisions to intervene and explored how the decision to use 
force in Libya affected Syria. Lappin (2014) analyzed the legal basis for military 
intervention in Syria and the precedents of using force by the international community. 
Cubukcu (2013) examined the R2P doctrine from these three perspectives: (a) legal, 
ethical, and political implications; (b) historical and moral implications; and (c) distrust 
and polarization within the UNSC. T. H. Lee (2014) compared the unilateral actions of 
the United States and Russia, in Syria and Crimea respectively, as illegal under 
international law. Conversely, R2P was used to measure legal intervention by the UNSC. 
Marrone (2015) examined the relationship among state responsibility, the international 
community, organizations, and civilians being impacted by devastation. Sloan (2014) 
examined the evolution of the role of the UNSC as peacekeepers, as opposed to military 
interventionists, even though the UNSC possessed the ability to use a strong offensive 
force. Thakur (2013) explained the third pillar of the R2P, describing it as 
“understandably contentious” (p. 61). Both Sloan and Thakur examined the conditions in 





Grover (2015) explained how semantics have allowed for the continuation of the 
mass loss of life and other atrocities to plague Syrian civilians, and how those who have 
veto power used language to continue to deny the use of force when there was no 
peaceful solution found. Furthermore, Grover (2015) stated that using veto power was an 
“act of aggression itself” (p. 1112). These examples conveyed the complexities of 
implementing Pillar 3, including legal concerns, moral indignation, P5 polarization, and 
the lack of regional support—particularly in the Middle East. These complexities have 
historically impeded the implementation of the R2P doctrine, thereby allowing for the 
continuation of mass death and suffering in countries such as Syria. 
These varying views have allowed for political friction within the international 
community, especially the UNSC. Bellamy and Williams (2006) analyzed the challenges 
of working through the subsystems and coalitions of the security council, and how these 
challenges have created political discord within the international community on using 
military force. Consequently, these challenges have stagnated the implementation of 
Pillar 3 by allowing unrest and instability to flourish in the Middle East, particularly in 
Syria. Grover (2015) indicated that life-or-death consequences existed for Syrian 
civilians because of members of the UNSC used veto power to stall the action by force 
where no peaceful options could end the mass atrocities.  
The R2P doctrine, as promoted by most member states in the UN, sought to 
advance the common ideological purposes and principles of peace and security for all. 
This doctrine indicates the need for collective intervention to stop the mass atrocities in 
Syria. For these reasons, the researcher conducted this study and identified the potential 





Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine suggested that when all diplomatic and peaceful 
means are exhausted to resolve a crisis, such as in the case of Syria, then using force as a 
tool for intervention by the UNSC should be a viable option. The use of force as an 
intervention tool, however, has been a point of contestation between members of the 
UNSC concerning matters related to Syria. Several studies revealed that implementing 
Pillar 3, particularly in the case of Syria, was controversial and complex. For example, 
Bailey (2014) posited that implementing Pillar 3 in Syria is contentious because there are 
no belligerent acts on both sides. Kildron (2012) stated that Syria was not a good 
candidate for Pillar 3 because the four criteria needed for success (i.e., an international 
mandate, a coalition of the willing, regional support, and a credible opposition force) 
were not present. Coen (2015) explained that the only way to protect the civilians in Syria 
was to classify them as refugees, thereby making them eligible for protection under R2P. 
Other researchers provided a different perspective on implementing Pillar 3 in the 
Syrian situation. Grover (2015) argued that the implementation of R2P by threat or force 
is justified when it comes to the purposes of the UN Charter (1945). Vanhullebusch 
(2015) articulated that military intervention through Pillar 3 should be implemented 
through regional organizations, as backed by the UNSC. Kolmašová (2016) suggested 
that the failure to act in Syria was not a failure of R2P, but of the imperfect actors and 
institutions charged with its implementation.  
The conflict in Syria placed the peace and security of the Syrian people—as well 
as the nation’s immediately in the proximity of this crisis—in grave danger. Mass 




engendered inhumane living conditions, and the use of chemical weapons exacerbated the 
suffering of the Syrian people. Coen (2015) suggested that the world was witnessing the 
greatest refugee crisis since World War II, where conflict, violence, and human rights 
violations have displaced millions of people, primarily due to the ongoing civil war in 
Syria. In addition, the number of fatalities was at least 560,000, with 6.7 million refugees 
and 6.2 million people who were internally displaced. According to the Global Centre for 
the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P), Syria had the largest number of people forcibly 
displaced by any conflict in the world; as of 2020, an estimated 12 million Syrians 
continue to remain in dire need of humanitarian assistance (Global Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect, 2019). 
Although R2P was guided by the three pillars to prevent/stop mass atrocities in 
states with leaders who fail to meet their responsibilities to protect their citizens, the 
achievement of consensus to implement Pillar 3 within the UNSC has allowed the crisis 
to manifest (Bellamy & Williams, 2006, p. 497). Norooz (2015) cited several areas in the 
world where civilian populations were at risk of mass atrocities and living in failed states. 
According to the three pillars of R2P, Syria is a failed state; therefore, the problem is a 
lack of study on policy by the UN to implement Pillar 3 when the UNSC fails to achieve 
consensus, and when all peaceful/diplomatic means have been exhausted, allowing the 
crisis to persist. In addition, the literature conveyed that a gap exists on implementing 
Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine. Overall, the problem that the current researcher aimed to 
examine was the inability of the UNSC to implement Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine fully 
and consistently, which authorizes the use of force to protect civilians from further 




records of the five permanent members (P5) of the UNSC, websites, videos, prior 
interviews conducted by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other documents 
that have impacted the implementation of Pillar 3 in Syria to determine whether there 
were viable policy alternatives to achieving consensus in the UNSC on implementing 
Pillar 3 on a case-by-case basis. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to impact positive social change by 
examining the implementation of Pillar 3 in a crisis-related situation, such as Syria. This 
purpose was vital, given that Syria has experienced mass atrocities between 2012 to the 
present, and continues to experience the disruption of peace and security within the 
international arena. The crisis in Syria has been described as a good example for using 
military force to protect Syrian civilians from further mass atrocities in accordance with 
the UN Charter (1945). The preamble of the UN Charter establishes the common interests 
and purposes of the UN. The preamble mentions three areas of common interests: (a) “to 
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, (b) to reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights, and (c) to establish the conditions under which justice and the respect for 
obligations from treaties and other sources of international law be maintained” (p. 2). In 
addition, the preamble states that armed force should not be used unless to in the 
preservation of common interests. Grover (2015) suggested that the preamble of the UN 
Charter indicates that fundamental human rights and the right of self-determination of all 
peoples were central to and a significant part of the pre-existing axiomatic “common 
interests” stated in that preamble (p. 1114). Grover further suggested that stopping or 




interests of the UN. Grover alleged that the protection of the fundamental human rights 
and human dignity of all peoples are foundational to international peace and security, 
which is not inconsistent with the purposes of the UN Charter (1945). These protections 
are articulated as core purposes, or common interests. 
The purposes and principles of the UN Charter (1945) are declared in its Chapter 
1, Article 1. Each successive section in Chapter 1 explains how this achieved, with 
emphasis on cultivating international peace and security through peaceful means. If all 
peaceful means have been exhausted and UNSC consensus seems an impossible 
conclusion, the use of force should be a viable option, according to the common 
purposes/interest of the UN Charter to maintain international peace and security. The last 
paragraph of Article 1, Section 7 authorizes the enforcement measures stated in Chapter 7 
of the UN Charter (1945). Chapter 7 of the UN Charter outlines the actions that may be 
taken, specifically by the UNSC, to address threats, breaches of the peace, and acts of 
aggression. Article 42 of Chapter 7 states that if all peaceful and diplomatic means prove 
inadequate, then forceful measures may be undertaken by air, sea, or land forces as 
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security (UN Charter, 1945, p. 
9). Consequently, the R2P doctrine, specifically Pillar 3, was addressed in the problem 
statement of this study; the researcher proposes the expansion of policy to guide the 
UNSC decision-making process on using force to stop mass atrocities in the future. 
Research Questions 
The research questions spurred the collection of credible information on the 
complexities of implementing Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine to stop/prevent mass atrocities 




complexities within the UNSC, where vetoes were used by a member of the P5 to disrupt 
consensus. Consequently, the researcher identified and explored the alternative 
policy(ies) on implementing Pillar 3 when there is non-consensus in the UNSC. The 
research questions were as follows: 
RQ1: Was R2P applied consistently across all modern crisis-related human 
endeavors? 
RQ2: Did the application of R2P result in negative outcomes? 
RQ3: Would a historically consistent application of R2P help alleviate the crisis 
in Syria? 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework for this study was the doctrine of the R2P itself. In 
December 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was 
formed by the Canadian government in response to then Secretary-General Kofi Annan. 
After the humanitarian crises in in the late 1990s, Annan presented the UN members with 
the question of when, how and why responding to humanitarian crises would be in 
accordance with the principles and purposes of the UN (UN Charter, 1945, p. 1). The 
ICISS (2001) found the following: 
That sovereignty not only gave a State the right to “control” its affairs, but it also 
conferred on the State primary “responsibility” for protecting the people within its 
borders. It proposed that when a State fails to protect its people – either through 
lack of ability or a lack of willingness – the responsibility shifts to the broader 




This framework (i.e., R2P) established the guidelines for the use of military force as an 
intervention tool to protect citizens at risk of mass atrocities. In addition, the researcher 
used the R2P framework to investigate the complexities of implementing Pillar 3 (i.e., the 
use of military force) by UNSC in a case, such as Syria. In Chapter 2, the researcher 
discusses this framework in the review of the literature by analyzing the history and 
traditions of nation-states, sovereignty, and protecting vulnerable populations. 
Nature of the Study 
The researcher selected a qualitative methodology approach to guide this study. 
Qualitative research seeks to explore phenomena through individuals’ personal 
experiences. Patton (2015) explained that the first contribution of qualitative inquiry is 
illuminating meanings and exploring how humans engage in meaning-making. A 
qualitative design allowed for the use of a case study approach to examine the actions of 
the UNSC in Syria. This led to an inability to reach a consensus on resolutions that called 
for the use of force, by the international community, to protect the Syrian civilian 
population from continued mass atrocities. Yin (2009) defined case study research as the 
study of a case within a real-life, contemporary context or setting. 
Definitions 
The researcher used the following terms and definitions frequently in developing 
and conducting this study. These terms enhanced the understanding of the challenges 
facing the international community in the historical context of sovereignty, with the 
emerging doctrine of R2P. Historically, sovereignty focused on the nation-state, while the 
R2P doctrine emphasizes individual sovereignty through the protection of civilians when 




Collective security: Collective security is a system of maintaining world peace 
and security by concerted action on the part of the nations of the world (Thakur, 2016).  
Exclusive sovereignty: T. H. Lee (2014) explained exclusive sovereignty as the 
idea that a sovereign state has autonomy within its own territory, and that no other state 
has the right or responsibility to interfere in how it treats its people, especially by force of 
arms. 
Internally displaced person (IDP): IDP describes an individual who has not 
crossed an international frontier, but has fled their home, for whatever reason (Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014). 
Jus cogens: Lappin (2014) defined the actions of using chemical weapons on the 
Syrian population, as jus cogen norms that amount to a crime against humanity, from 
which no state may derogate in its actions. 
Just war theory (JWT): Parsons (2013) stated that war under certain conditions 
can be morally justified. There are three principles parts of JWT: (a) jus ad bellum, the 
justice of resorting to war; (b) jus in bello, just conduct in war; and (c) jus post bellum, 
justice at the end of war. Norooz (2015) explained that JWT needs two conditions to be 
satisfied, to justify intervention: (a) the right reasons and (b) mass loss of civilian life. 
Nation-state: The term nation-state conjoins the political entity of a state to the 
cultural entity of a nation from which it derives its political legitimacy to rule and its 
status as a sovereign state (Guibernau, 2013). 
Popular sovereignty: Grover (2015) referred to sovereignty being derived from 




in direct contestation with the notion of state sovereignty because power lies with the 
people, instead of the regime.  
Refugees: This term describes people who have crossed an international frontier 
and are at risk or have been victims of persecution in their country of origin (Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014). 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Doctrine: R2P is the enabling principle that first 
obligates individual nation-states and then the international community to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. 
The idea is that sovereignty is not a privilege, but a responsibility (UN Regional 
Information Center for Western Europe, 2017). Ainley (2015) defined R2P as follows: 
“Human life, human dignity, human rights raised above even the entrenched concept of 
State sovereignty” (pp. 37–38).  
Sovereignty: Sovereignty refers to the right of each state to manage domestic 
affairs free from external interference (Bailey, 2014). Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
(1945) described sovereignty as “territorial integrity and political independence” (as cited 
in Bailey, 2014, p. 109). 
State responsibility: State responsibility is defined as the obligations a state has to 
the international community to maintain peace and security (Borelli, 2017). Internal focus 
is the responsibility on the part of the state to protect its own people, while external focus 
is the responsibility of the international community to act when the host state is unwilling 




Westphalian system: This global system is based on the principle of international 
law that each state has sovereignty over its territory and domestic affairs, to the exclusion 
of all external powers, and that each state is equal in international law (Teschke, 2002).  
Assumptions 
Assumptions are statements that the researcher presumes to be true, but which are 
unverifiable (Merriam, 2014). The key variable was assumed for implementing Pillar 3 of 
the R2P doctrine as achieving consensus within the UNSC, resulting in the collective 
action to forcefully intervene on behalf of the civilian population in Syria, thereby 
creating a sense of legality and legitimacy within the international community about the 
intervention. 
The researcher used what Creswell (2013) called “thick or complex description” 
(p. 1094). Thick description is where the researcher gives detailed accounts of the 
participants or setting. In this case, the researcher used prolonged engagement and 
persistent observation of the data, triangulation of the data sources, peer review or 
debriefing, and clarifying researcher bias (see Creswell, 2013). To ensure trustworthiness 
or reliability, the researcher used interceding agreement on the research study. In 
addition, the researcher used multiple sources of data for triangulation.  
To ensure quality, the researcher used four criteria: substantive contribution (i.e., 
the study contributes to overall understanding), aesthetic merit (i.e., the researcher 
succeeded aesthetically by inviting interpretive responses, and finding whether these 
were creative, complex, and not boring), reflexivity (i.e., the researcher held himself 
accountable for biases), and impact (i.e., the emotional and intellectual effect on the 




implement Pillar 3 when there was no consensus in the UNSC and mass atrocities 
continue to cause severe suffering on a civilian population (i.e., Syria). The researcher 
addressed his self-awareness and self-exposure and held himself accountable by stating 
his biases upfront. The researcher reflected upon those biases more thoroughly and 
reported the results.  
Scope and Delimitations 
The scope of this study included the civilian population of Syria, where the 
population is caught in the middle of a civil war, proxy war, and the war on terror from 
the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2012 to the present. Global governance and 
humanitarian intervention were closely related concepts that were not investigated in this 
research. Although each concept advocates for some form of protection for civilians at 
risk for crimes against humanity, each fall short in stating there is a distinct responsibility 
of states to provide protection for their citizens.  
In this study, the researcher focused on the lack of UNSC cooperation and 
cohesion on the implementation of Pillar 3. The UNSC is divided along P3 (United 
States, United Kingdom, and France) and P2 (Russia and China) lines, where the 
differences in ideology (political, economic, environmental, and strategic) have 
contributed to discord. The researcher used triangulation to provide a rich data set on the 
lack of cooperation and cohesion in the UNSC by examining and collecting data from 
multiple sources. These sources included email interviews, observations from websites, 
and analysis of public documents (e.g., voting records and speeches). The researcher used 
NVivo software for coding, keywords, and journal notes on R2P to establish themes and 





This study was limited by the complexity of achieving consensus within the 
UNSC for implementing Pillar 3 in situations where mass atrocities are being committed, 
particularly in Syria, 2012 to present. Coen (2015) suggested that based on the political 
dynamics within the UNSC, using coercive force in Syria was not a viable option. Coen 
further suggested that invoking Pillar 3 requires that all members of the P5 to agree by 
actively voting or abstaining on the merits of intervention. Conversely, Grover (2015) 
articulated that those P5 members using their veto power to obstruct the implementation 
of Pillar 3 are using stall tactics based on semantics and these tactics can result in life-or-
death consequences. These complexities revolved around the national interests and 
ideological beliefs of P5 members and how they were inclined to change on a case-by-
case basis, thereby limiting the researcher’s ability to generalize the findings.  
While the researcher engaged in an exhaustive and prolonged research process, 
the large volume of data, as well as the crisis in Syria, continues to be debated within the 
UNSC to this data; therefore, it is likely that valuable data was omitted. Furthermore, the 
unique international experiences, alliances, and national interests of each participant, 
factored into their perspective on the R2P phenomenon, which resulted in decreasing 
their ability to achieve a consensus on the implementing Pillar 3 in Syria. National 
strategic interests had the single greatest impact on implementing Pillar 3 in crisis related 
situations. There was only a single case (Libya) where the UNSC achieved consensus to 
implement Pillar 3 measures, limiting its potential dependability and transferability.  
There may have been potential biases from the researcher. The researcher’s 




significantly from the data collected from the participants. The researcher’s personal 
experiences with different cultures and education in politics and international relations 
have provided him with a well-rounded outlook into the limitations of his knowledge that 
may have biased this study. The strategies that the researcher used to address these biases 
were triangulation, reflexivity, and persistent prolonged engagement of the research data. 
In Chapter 3, a researcher presents a more detailed discussion of these techniques.  
Significance of the Study 
The significance of the study filled a gap in the literature by understanding and 
promoting policy and procedure that allows for the proper implementation of Pillar 3 
when consistent with the purposes and principle of the UN Charter (1945), specifically in 
terms of the maintenance of the international peace and security. If all other diplomatic 
and peaceful gestures were exhausted, then the UN still has an obligation to render 
solutions to mass atrocity crimes being committed. Leaders require alternative policies 
allowing for the UN general assembly to organize regional organizations, regional states, 
or coalitions of the willing to implement Pillar 3 with a majority of support from 
UN/UNSC member states, despite a veto from a P5 member. The policy impact may 
involve being able to bypass the UNSC when it fails to achieve consensus on 
implementing Pillar 3 to stop or prevent mass atrocity crimes form occurring or 
continuing, as it has in Syria.  
The UN Charter (1945) explained how faith in fundamental human rights, dignity, 
and equal rights of all people are in the common interests of the international community, 
and that “save in the common-interests” force should not be used. Mass atrocities that 




not have a one-size-fits-all resolution. Thus, these may require forceful intervention. The 
crisis in Syria revealed how UNSC inaction has contributed to the continuation of 
suffering by civilians in Syria. By expanding policy on implementing Pillar 3 to include 
regional countries, regional states, coalitions of the willing, and powerful states that act in 
the interests of the UN Charter, future crisis of mass atrocities may be preventable or 
deterred. Grover (2015) stated that although the UNSC was designated as the body 
authorized to implement Pillar 3 and to maintain international peace and security, it is the 
“UN Charter that is the ultimate guide for each member state in fulfilling the purposes 
and principles of the UN” (pp. 1118–1120). 
The knowledge from this study contributed to existing policy and expanded the 
decision-making process of implementing Pillar 3 giving authority to the UN general 
assembly, on a case-by-case basis, when the UNSC does not meet its R2P obligations 
because of P5 veto power. The UN Charter (1945) preamble made it clear that resorting 
to war was a potentially necessary and legitimate option in certain circumstances 
(Grover, 2015). 
Significance to Practice 
In this study, the researcher advanced a policy toward the acceptance by the 
international community, the UN, and the security council, all of whom needed to be 
collaborators in the responsibility to protect vulnerable populations in the future, thus 
living up to their obligations under the UN Charter (1945) of promoting human dignity. 
With the emergence of the acceptance of fundamental human rights on the rise, and the 




who “manifestly fail to protect their populations,” maintaining international peace and 
security was paramount (UN Charter, 1945). This can prevent mass migration, mass 
displacement, and mass atrocities, thus lessening the burden on neighboring states and 
providing for the human dignity of those at-risk populations (UN Charter, 1945). 
Significance to Theory 
The researcher aimed to advance the acceptance of Pillar 3 by the international 
community, the UN, and the security council, all of which need to be collaborators in the 
responsibility to protect vulnerable populations in the future. The impact allowed those 
at-risk civilians to seek safe havens that will be established by the intervening forces, 
thereby giving them access to the necessities needed to be secure. In addition, Kildron 
(2012) suggested advancing policy based on what he called the Libyan model, outlining 
that four criteria should be met before intervention is appropriate. These criteria include 
the following: (a) there must be an international mandate calling for intervention, (b) 
there must be a broad coalition to protect civilians, (c) there must be presence of regional 
support, and (d) a credible opposition force must already be on the ground (Kildron, 
2012). These four criteria were used as a guideline to expand on existing policy that may 
be used by the UNSC or the UN general assembly when considering implementing Pillar 
3 in the future.  
Significance to Social Change 
The implications for positive social change of this study meant safety and security 
to many civilians who face mass atrocities and crimes against humanity, as defined by the 




for the use of force to prevent/limit mass human atrocities, which would serve the greater 
good of the international community by promoting peace, stability, and security. In this 
study, the researcher examined the literature for the UN to explore instituting policy that 
will allow other member states to act, when the UNSC was unable to reach a consensus. 
The positive social impact would allow displaced civilians the opportunity to seek safe 
havens, where they would receive medical supplies, food, water, and shelter. 
Furthermore, establishing safe havens would be beneficial to neighbor states, where mass 
migration has had a negative impact on these states’ economic, political, and 
environmental well-being, thus influencing safety and security of these displaced 
individuals by creating a burden on the host countries.  
Summary  
In this chapter, the researcher provided the introduction, background, problem 
statement, and purpose of the study. This researcher conducted a qualitative case study on 
the UNSC and the implementation of R2P, using the Syria crisis as a case study and 
example. Additionally, the researcher provided an overview on the contents of the 
research question, assumptions, and limitations of the study. Finally, the researcher 
concluded the chapter with the significance of the study and the implications for positive 
social change, through expanding the R2P doctrine in future crises, that threaten 
international peace and security. Chapter 2 includes a detailed analysis of the literature on 
the R2P doctrine, presenting alternative views on using force, particularly in Syria. In 
Chapter 3, the researcher provides a detailed explanation of the research plan for this 




discusses the interpretations of the findings, limitations of the study, implications for 
positive social change, recommendations for future research, and conclusions. 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The problem that the current researcher aimed to address was the inability of the 
UNSC to implement Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine, which authorizes the use of force, in 
this case, to protect Syrian civilians from further suffering and mass atrocities since 2012. 
The lack of cooperation and cohesion in the UNSC has allowed the crisis in Syria to 
continue, despite exhausting what appears to be all efforts under Pillar 1 and 2. Grover 
(2015) surmised that members in the UNSC use their veto power to prevent action by the 
UNSC, which is an act of aggression toward the Syrian people, particularly when all 
peaceful means have been exhausted. 
Traditionally, the intervention into the internal affairs of a state by another state 
was not an accepted practice, within the international order. Usually, these types of 
actions were only taken when a state had a personal stake in the matter; therefore, 
forceful intervention was done only on behalf of those citizens of the intervening state 
who were at risk, or it was done on behalf of the allies of the intervening state, or to 
protect the property of the intervening state. Bellamy and Williams (2006) found that 
historically, these obstacles coalesced to produce a default policy environment that was 
strongly averse to forceful intervention. Mistrust was also a key element in the traditional 
international order for non-interventionist and the principles of exclusive sovereignty of 




intentions. National self-interests, coercion to implement political agendas, economic 
agendas, and strategic alliances are some conditions that created this mistrust. Syria was a 
prime example of the phenomenon. All the conditions were present, according to the R2P 
doctrine, to proclaim Syria a failed state. The national interests of Russia, China, and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), however, as well as a lack of political will 
and public support, have led to a lack of real solutions being implemented in Syria. In the 
interim, Syrian civilians continue to suffer mass atrocities, while the international 
community remains reluctant to use force to stop/prevent further loss of life and 
continued suffering. Thakur (2013) found that although successful, the Libyan operation 
proved to be controversial among emerging powers, and the Syrians have paid the price 
for this controversy. Consequently, the UNSC allowed the Syrian crisis to continue 
because of the failures and consequences of the use of force in Libya, and a lack of 
strategic policy on forceful intervention moving forward. In this chapter, the researcher 
provides an overview of the literature search, analyzes R2P theory regarding the Syrian 
crisis, and examines the complexities of implementing Pillar 3 in Syria in the current 
framework of the UNSC. 
Literature Search Strategy 
The researcher gathered the articles used in this study from multiple sources. 
Most of these sources stemmed from the database of the Walden University Library, 
along with Google Scholar. There was no specific date range used in the search process, 
but specific attention was paid to articles within the 5-year range of acceptance; however, 
articles that addressed the historical significance and development of constructs related to 




searches. These searches focused on R2P, humanitarianism, and human security. The 
databases included Homeland Security Digital Library, Political Science Complete, 
Military & Government Collection, International Security and Counter Terrorism 
Reference Center, Expanded Academic ASAP, ProQuest Central, Sage Journals, Thoreau 
Multi-Database Search, and United Nations Public Administration Network. In Google 
Scholar searches, the researcher focused on all sources related to the R2P principle, 
including books, articles, websites, videos, and organizations. When searching Google 
Scholar articles, the researcher limited the scope to peer-reviewed articles to ensure 
additional credibility. The following keywords/phrases were used, either individually or 
in combinations, to find articles relevant to R2P and Syria: human security; economic 
development; protecting civilians; Libya; Syria, mass atrocities, four core crimes against 
humanity; UN Charter and the use of force; preventive security; international relations; 
national security; world poverty; just war; humanitarianism and the use of force; 
intervention and the use of force; global chaos, world hunger; Arab Spring; UNSC and 
the responsibility to protect; UN resolutions on Syria; State sovereignty vs individual 
rights; human dignity; and maintaining international peace and security. The scope of the 
literature as previously mentioned, focused on articles of the past 5 years, except for 
information which provided a historical context. The areas with limited current research 
available are identified in statements throughout the study. 
Theoretical Foundation 
The theoretical foundation of this study was the doctrine of R2P. The R2P 
doctrine includes three principles that guide the international community on protecting 




are few established theories on protecting individuals where their human rights are 
considered to have been violated. Marrone (2015) examined the impact of R2P regarding 
human security and human rights, where the global community has a responsibility to 
protect civilians during conflict and post-conflict. The doctrine of R2P has evolved from 
other theories that have emphasized protecting vulnerable populations and their 
fundamental human rights: human security, humanitarian intervention, and global 
governance. Hobbes (2010), Locke (1947), and Bodin (1992) explained their thoughts on 
social contract theory, and the League of Nations (1920–1946) attempted to avert conflict 
and maintain peace and security (as cited in Shapiro, 2010). The intent behind the R2P 
doctrine—holding nation-states accountable to the international community for the 
maintenance of peace and security—was not the first attempt by the international 
community to hold nation-states accountable. The R2P doctrine was the theory that 
emerged within the most recognized international authority—the UN—to address those 
breaches of the peace contrary to the common purposes and principles of the UN General 
Assembly (2005). 
The treaty of Westphalia of 1648 established nation-states in a world where every 
nation was governed either by an absolute monarch, tribal chief, or a theocratic hierarchy 
(as cited in Toavs, n.d.). Westphalian sovereignty was based on the concept of a 
sovereign state, governed by a sovereign ruler, that was based on establishing prejudice 
in international affairs against interference in another nation's domestic business (Toavs, 
n.d.). Nevertheless, the world has evolved to include governments that are more 
representative of the people, including political bodies (i.e., U.S. Congress, parliament, 




type of political entity. Consequently, the nation-state became the primary medium by 
which people identified themselves within the international community. The treaty of 
Westphalia stood as the precursor to future international treaties, and to the development 
of international law in general (Toavs, n.d.). 
Philosophers Thomas Hobbes and John Locke were some of the earliest seminal 
thinkers to believe that nation-states, or the sovereigns thereof, had some type of 
responsibility to protect its citizens (Shapiro, 2010). Hobbes (2010) believed in the rights 
of individuals and in the equality of all men, and he subscribed to the notion that the 
contract that exists between men and the prevailing authority, only holds true, as long as, 
the authority can provide protection (Shapiro, 2010). Differing from Hobbes (2010), 
Locke (1947) believed that rulers only derive their authority through the consent of the 
people, as power is delegated and can be removed for violating the terms of that trust 
(Shapiro, 2010). Nevertheless, these early philosophers believed that protection of 
individual rights were a part of the social contract between the prevailing sovereign 
authority and their people. 
The League of Nations (1919–1946) is one of the more well-known attempts by 
the international community at cooperation or collective security to maintain peace and 
security throughout the world. The three main objectives of the League, as stated by the 
UN Office at Geneva (n.d.), were (a) to ensure collective security, (b) to assure functional 
cooperation, and (c) to execute the mandates of peace treaties (p. 3). In the History of the 
League of Nations, the United Nations Office at Geneva (n.d.) explained the following: 
Born with the will of the victors of the First World War to avoid a repeat of a 




within the framework of the fundamental principles of the Pact accepted by its 
Members: to develop cooperation among nations and to guarantee them peace and 
security. (p. 1)  
Despite some early successes, however, the League of Nations could not prevent events 
that led to World War II and the eventual demise of the League.  
Despite these early successes, the League of Nations could not prevent the 
invasion of Manchuria by Japan, nor the annexation of Ethiopia by Italy in 1936, nor that 
of Austria by Hitler in 1938. The powerlessness of the League of Nations to prevent 
further world conflict, the alienation of part of its member states, and the generation of 
the war itself added to its demise from 1940 (UN Office at Geneva, n.d.). Although the 
League of Nations sought to prevent conflict through cooperation and collective security, 
the crises that led up to World War II helped to return some nation-states (i.e., Germany, 
Italy, and Japan) back to the traditional system of defensive alliances and power blocs 
(UN Office at Geneva, n.d.). By the end of World War II, the Allies were determined to 
create a new organization, the UN, which had many similarities to the League of Nations. 
In sum, after World War I, the international community established the League of 
Nations for nation-states to have a forum to communicate their grievances to avoid 
conflicts that might lead to another war.  
On June 26, 1945, the UN was created by the Allies after their victory in World 
War II. The preamble of the UN states the common purposes and principles of the 
organization, which bore many similarities to that of the League of Nations. The first 
sentence of the UN Charter (1945) cites the goal “to save succeeding generations from 




(p. 2). The League of Nations discussed the “avoidance of a repeat of a devastating war” 
(UN Office at Geneva, n.d., p. 1). Each document discusses the maintenance of peace and 
security through cooperation and collective security. The UN Charter (1945) charged the 
UNSC with providing that collective security. Chapter 7 of the Charter specifically 
discusses the actions available to the UNSC when there are breaches of the peace. At the 
conclusion of the Cold War, discussed earlier, those breaches of the peace began to be 
recognized more in the form of individual fundamental human rights. The mass atrocities 
committed in Bosnia and Rwanda ignited the beginnings of a change in thinking where 
individual sovereignty, at times, would challenge the notion of state sovereignty. These 
events resulted in fierce debate about the responsibility of the international community, 
according to the common purposes and principles of the UN Charter. 
Walzer positioned Just and Unjust Wars as a challenge to the arguments made 
both by realists and by international lawyers within those debates, urging that the 
commitment to state sovereignty and the prohibition on the use of force in 
international relations must give way in situations where those principles hamper 
the defense of human rights or self-determination. (Orford, 2013, p. 83) 
After these crises in the 1990s, the Department for International Development in Security 
recommended the development of “a more effective international system” in Chapter 5 
(UN Charter, 1945). The two points of emphasis were the following: 
(a) Since the Cold War, the UN plays a vital role in promoting global security, 
and despite taking on a larger role in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, there have 
been failings in preventing/stopping ‘large-scale ethnic cleansing and genocide; 




catastrophic suffering and violence. Although protecting citizens is the primary 
duty of each state, the international system must be able to respond when states 
fail in their responsibilities to protect ordinary people. (UN Charter, 1945, p. 17) 
Shortly after these crises of the 1990s, the ICISS (2001) issued the R2P report to Annan. 
This report was designed to address those failings mentioned by the Department for 
International Development to protect “ordinary people” from mass atrocities (UN Office 
at Geneva, n.d.). 
The R2P was universally accepted by the members of the UN at the 2005 World 
Summit (UN General Assembly, 2005). At this summit, leaders established the outcome 
document. Through the UNSC, the members of the international community will assume 
the responsibility to protect through peaceful (i.e., diplomatic) means. When such 
peaceful means fail, however, the UNSC must be prepared to take collective action in a 
timely and decisive manner, according to the UN Charter (1945).  
The major theoretical proposition for R2P is the protection of civilian populations 
in failed or failing states, where human rights and human dignity have been violated. The 
R2P states that the international community has a duty to the civilians living in failing 
states, as opposed to the traditional notion of sovereignty. In addition, the use of force 
may be required if all other peaceful means have been exhausted.  
The shifting of paradigms from state-centered to individual-centered rights, based 
on the common purposes listed in the preamble of the UN Charter (1945), lie at the core 
of the R2P doctrine. Grover (2015) argued that the implementation of R2P by threat or 
use of force is justified when it is consistent with the purposes of the UN Charter (1945). 




rights of exclusive state sovereignty, where states have failed or neglected to fulfill their 
responsibilities to maintain the international order of peace and security. 
In summary, R2P is not only a viable principle; but one which goes to the heart of 
the international rule of law, the intent and meaning of the UN Charter (1945) and the 
credibility of the UN as a mechanism for the promotion of human rights and the 
achievement of international peace and security (Grover, 2015). The current researcher 
used the R2P theory as the basis for examining Syria and the use of force, focusing on 
Pillar 3 and how the UNSC, through veto power, has failed to achieve consensus on 
forceful intervention to stop the mass atrocities and human rights violations in this crisis.  
The crisis in Syria continues to be a strain on the international community. If 
unaddressed, this crisis is likely to lead to mass migration, internal displacement, and 
excessive human rights violations that have breached the peace and security in the region, 
subsequently creating instability and chaos within the international system. Theoretically, 
the R2P charges individual states and the international community to maintain peace and 
security, as outlined in the three pillars of the R2P doctrine and in accordance with the 
common purposes of the of the UN Charter (1945). Grover (2015) articulated that all 
member states must protect the fundamental rights as stated by the common interests of 
the UN Charter (1945). As defined by R2P, Syria should be classified as a failed state. 
After exhausting most, if not all, peaceful means to end this crisis, implementing Pillar 3 
and allowing the UNSC to use force should have been the next step taken to end the 
suffering of the Syrian civilian population. The UNSC established precedence with R2P 
in the Libyan crisis. Despite similar circumstances, however, the reaction by the UNSC in 




effects of not implementing Pillar 3 in Syria to protect the civilian population from 
further/continued mass atrocities.  
The research questions asked the following: 
RQ1: Was R2P applied consistently across all modern crisis-related human 
endeavors? 
RQ2: Did the application of R2P result in negative outcomes? 
RQ3: Would a historically consistent application of R2P help alleviate the crisis 
in Syria? 
The research questions both challenge and build on the policies and procedures of 
implementing the R2P doctrine. First, the research questions challenged the existing 
protocol of consensus within the UNSC to authorize the use of force. Current UN Charter 
regulations only justify forceful interventions for two reasons: (a) self-defense, 
individually or collectively, or (b) UNSC authorization of force to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. T. H. Lee (2014) referred to this as bifocal orthodoxy, 
which denies any role of custom in defining jus as bellum (i.e., right to war).  
The R2P created expectations for nation-states to uphold their responsibilities to 
provide safety and security to their citizens. If a state manifestly fails in those same 
responsibilities, then that responsibility should be assumed by international community. 
Additionally, if all peaceful means have been exhausted, then the UNSC’s use of force is 
deemed justifiable; this establishes that forceful interventions should not reside only in 
cases of self-defense (UN Charter, 1945). Crises that place civilians are at risk due to 
mass atrocities and continually disrupt international peace and security, such as the 




Furthermore, the research questions challenged the UNSC voting process on 
authorization to use force, by examining the use of veto power by the P5 members. 
Grover (2015) explained that the use of the veto by Russia and China, in the Syrian crisis, 
is an act of aggression. Grover contended that the continued abuse of this power allowed 
the status-quo to persist in Syria, which is fundamentally against the common interests of 
the UN, as stated in the UN Charter’s goal to protect the human rights and dignity and 
maintain peace and security. Second, the research questions build upon R2P by 
examining additional policies and procedures for implementing R2P. Odeyemi (2016) 
suggested that the presence of certain criteria can improve prospects for success. This 
author applied this criterion in the Syrian case and to future crises in protecting civilian 
populations at risk for mass atrocities. In addition, the research questions build on the 
existing theory by analyzing the use of ‘veto power' to prevent collective action by the 
UNSC, thereby, allowing crisis of mass atrocities to go unchecked by the international 
community. Vanhullebusch (2015) argued for regional forces or other coalitions of the 
willing to be authorized to use force to implement no-fly zones, safe zones, and other 
limited military strategies, to provide protection. In conclusion, the study, via the research 
questions, challenged and build upon the existing theory by examining the bifocal 
orthodoxy approach, the voting process, and the use of veto power by the P5 to determine 
the implementation of Pillar 3 to protect future populations at risk of mass atrocities. 
Conceptual Framework 
The researcher examined the concept of an improved implementation of the R2P 
doctrine. The R2P doctrine comprises three principles that guide the international 




suffering mass atrocities. For this study, the concept focused on the failure of the UNSC 
to achieve consensus to implement the use of force, specifically in Syria, despite the 
crisis reaching an impossible conclusion of peace, without the international community 
intervening to protect at-risk populations from mass atrocities. Due to the complexities of 
interests by the P5 members of the UNSC, consensus—which is currently a requirement 
of Pillar 3 to use force—has not been achieved. Russia and China have opposed any type 
of military intervention in Syria. Their opposition stems from the outcomes of the 
intervention in Libya. Morris (2013) stated that UNCS members, namely Russia and 
China, have used the failings associated with NATO’s means of implementation of force 
in Libya, as justification to veto collective action in Syria. Grover (2015) suggested that 
by using their veto power, Russia and China have led the UNSC to fail implementing 
Pillar 3 by the means necessary to end ongoing mass atrocities, which is an act of 
aggression in and of itself (p. 1113). In this chapter, the researcher explores the concept 
known as Pillar 3, forceful collective intervention, and examines the complexities 
associated within the UNSC to achieve consensus on implementing force in Syria to 
protect civilians, which has allowed for the crisis to persist. 
Synthesis of the Literature 
The R2P is the lens that researchers have used to view the crisis in Libya, which 
is similar to the crisis in Syria. Norooz (2015) argued that his article on the intervention 
in Libya sheds the light on the crisis through the lens of the R2P. The conflict in Libya 
began as a peaceful opposition to the Gaddafi government; however, Gaddafi reacted by 
using violence against the opposition, which responded in kind, leading to full armed 




opposition leadership, which came to be recognized as the Transitional National Council. 
Gaddafi employed his special forces to retake the city using rhetoric on par with rhetoric 
uses in the Rwandan crisis. Alarmed by such talk and witnessing the emergence of 
human atrocities, regional organizations deemed these crimes against humanity. Norooz 
(2015) found that the regimes behavior could amount to “crimes against humanity” (p. 
106), and the European Union described this as “a violation of human rights” (p. 106). 
The United Nations tried several diplomatic measures to quell Gaddafi's behavior, 
including passing Resolution 1970, which acknowledged Libya's responsibility to protect 
its citizens; however, Gaddafi continued his attacks. Eventually, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) issued a statement to the regime condemning its actions, and even 
found grounds to charge the Libyan Gaddafi regime guilty of mass atrocities crimes. The 
ICC was viewed by the international community, particularly the UN, as mirroring R2P. 
Ainley (2015) explained that both had comparable purposes: to engage crimes and 
atrocities through preventing, protecting, and prosecuting to calm the way international 
politics were conducted and to end the impunity. Kofi Annan suggested that the 
“expectations of human rights, human dignity, and human life, were to rise above the 
traditional concept of state sovereignty” (as cited in Ainley, 2015, p. 37). Consequently, 
global recognition of R2P, in the 21st century included the absence of fear and want. 
Nevertheless, Ainley concluded that both R2P and the ICC are in crisis. This crisis exists 
because of the cost of intervention, insufficient political will, lack of majority support, its 
unpopularity, and it is a hard-public sale. These issues have prevented a consensus, which 
has legitimatized the deployment of force based on R2P. In an article about the swinging 




implementing Resolution 1973 to intervene in Libya and the ongoing debate on using 
force in Syria. Morris (2013) found there was no opposition to the implementation of 
Resolution 1973:10 votes for and five abstained. Russia, China, and India, although 
acquiescing in the Libya vote, chose to use their veto power in the debate on Syria. 
Russia, China, and India have been skeptical of the West's use of R2P as a regime change 
strategy. Morris (2013) described their feelings as “embers of long-held suspicions over 
trustworthiness of western powers with neo-imperial proclivities” (p. 1280).  
In conclusion, there are certain requirements for R2P to be implemented. These 
included mass loss-of-life, proper intentions, domestic and regional support, and a legal, 
moral, legitimate agent (UNSC) to exercise this concept. Each article specifies a reason 
R2P, in concert with the ICC in one article, has failed to live up to expectations. Morris 
(2013) suggested that Pillar 3, which identifies the right to use force in exceptional cases 
(e.g., Syria), should be removed as an option after acknowledging that “[the] use of force 
is a core concept in responding to mass atrocities” (p. 1283). Ainley (2015) explained 
how R2P and the ICC should refocus their strategies, even though the UNSC must 
address the conflict in Syria. Ainley described both R2P and the ICC as being in crisis, 
and by refocusing their strategy on moving toward producing institutions that make 
conflict less likely, by promoting good governance, economic prosperity, and state 
responsibility, while building better justice systems to deter crimes of mass atrocities. 
The conclusions of Norooz (2015) aligned with those of Ainley (2015). Norooz (2015) 
suggested a gap in the three pillars, designated by the UN, for state responsibilities, as 
missing a fourth pillar. He calls this missing pillar, the responsibility to rebuild. Norooz 




the political will. By not addressing this missing pillar in Libya, critiques of the R2P will 
continue. Researchers should address the disarmament, national reconciliation, and the 
recovery, as suggested by Norooz (2015). Moreover, the socioeconomic, political, and 
environmental drawbacks of intervention may have reduced or eliminated the rise of 
terrorist organizations, such as Daesh or ISIS.  
Literature Review 
The R2P was the theoretical lens this study employed to analyze the crisis in 
Syria. The R2P is a three-pillared doctrine designed to hold UN member states to a 
certain standard, regarding the safety and security of its citizens. The first two pillars 
address prevention by declaring that (a) each sovereign state has a responsibility to 
protect civilians within its borders, and (b) the rest of the international community has a 
responsibility to ensure that each sovereign state lives up to this responsibility (T. H. Lee, 
2014). For the current study, the researcher analyzed the third pillar only. To answer the 
research questions, the researcher presented a literature review of a historical background 
about the complexities of using force as an intervention tool, especially when there is 
non-consensus within the UNSC. Additionally, the researcher examined the inconsistent 
application of Pillar 3 by comparing the cases of Libya and Syria. Finally, the researcher 
examined the many sides of the R2P debate, as well as the complexities, based on the 






The review of the literature revealed the history of the international community as 
it relates to the notion of sovereignty and protecting vulnerable civilian populations. 
Philosophers Hobbes (1668/2010), Locke (1947), and Bodin (1992) promoted the safety 
and security of the civilian populations associated with their respective government 
(Shapiro, 2010). Hobbes (1668/2010) was a believer in the right of the individual; the 
natural equality of all men, and the artificial character of the political order (Toavs, n.d.). 
In Leviathan, Hobbes (1668/2010) stated that the contract that exists between men and 
the prevailing authority, only holds true if the authority can provide protection. it is at this 
point, when protection cannot be provided, that the contract/agreement is no longer viable 
(Shapiro, 2010). When protection cannot be provided, the contract/agreement is no longer 
viable (Shapiro, 2010).  
Locke (1947) believed that the ruler (authority) only derived their authority from 
the consent of the people. Because power is delegated by the people, it can also 
legitimately be removed for violating the terms of the people’s trust (Shapiro, 2010). 
Furthermore, Locke (1947) reckoned, “The government is the trustee which functions for 
and is responsible to the people who create the trust” (p. 46). 
Bodin (1992) suggested that sovereignty would remain absolute while in the 
hands of the authority (individual or group); however, Bodin also indicated the sovereign 
could not confiscate personal property without just cause, thereby seemingly 
acknowledging individuals’ rights. Bodin emerged after the threat of Westphalia in 1648 




sovereign (individual or group). This process established a prejudice in international 
affairs against interference in another nation’s domestic business. Bodin was considered 
the first source on the modern concept of sovereignty (Toavs, n.d.).  
Through this analysis of philosophers, it is clear that considerations of individual 
rights and their protection, has been a concern throughout history. The literature indicated 
sovereignty and the rights of individuals have come into contestation with the concept of 
sovereignty. Hobbes not only believed in the notion of absolutism of sovereignty, but he 
was also a proponent of the right of the individual and the natural equality of all men 
(Toavs, n.d.). Hugo Grotius, considered to have laid the foundations of international law, 
argued for the protection of non-combatants during times of war, as well as presupposing 
certain fundamental human rights, such as the right to life, food, and medicine (Toavs, 
n.d.). In addition, Hugo Grotius argued for what may be considered humanitarian 
intervention, he that states might be able to act on behalf of individuals who were victims 
“of injuries which … excessively violate the law of nature or of nations regarding any 
person” (Apple & White, 2007, para. 2). 
In summary, the early notions of sovereignty, based on influential philosophers of 
that time, took into consideration the rights of individuals. Locke (1947), Hobbes (2010), 
Bodin (1992), and Grotius all mentioned—to some degree—the individual and their place 
in the international system of order. Hobbes believed in the natural equality of all men, 
while Locke (1947) believed the government should be responsible for and to the people 
who created their trust. Grotius—moving forward for the purposes of this study—had the 




Grotius (Toavs, n.d.) considered individuals to be actors within the international 
society. He wrote extensively on human law, a precursor of what is today known as 
international human rights law (as cited in the Apple & White, 2007). Individual human 
rights, and how they are perceived, in terms of sovereignty within the international order, 
is revealed by the literature in the following sections of the literature review.  
There were several related theories to R2P that were analyzed in this study, as 
they relate to sovereignty and protecting civilians. Barqueiro et al. (2016) examined 
Humanitarian Intervention and Human Security in the historical aspects of trying to 
protect civilians from mass atrocities and human rights violations. Bailey (2014) 
surmised that the governments, according to customary international law, should act to 
prevent mass atrocity crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law (p. 
110). Vanhullebusch (2015) compared human security and humanitarianism by 
examining how the Arab League could provide military force, while respecting the 
fundamental standards of humanity, according to the common purposes and principles of 
the UN Charter (1945).  
The end of the Cold War ushered in a new era of confronting mass atrocities 
associated with genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. No longer 
divided by the polarization created by the alliances of U.S./NATO vs the Soviet 
Union/Warsaw Pact, the international community needed to find strategies to confront 
these crises, that usually fell along the continuum of this polarization. One example of 
this is, the Brezhnev Doctrine, which asserts the Soviet Union’s authority/rights to 
intervene in the internal affairs of those states that comprise the socialist bloc 




States (Truman, Nixon, and Reagan doctrines); after World War II, the United States 
became fully interventionist. U.S. interventionism was motivated primarily by the goal of 
containing the influence of communism (Yoon, 1997).  
The Brezhnev Doctrine of intervention to protect the self-determination of 
socialist countries in the face of capitalist threats and the Reagan Doctrine advocating the 
legitimacy of pro-democratic invasion were met with protest and skepticism (Orford, 
2013, p. 94). Gholiagha (2015) stated that following the end of the Cold War, the UNSC 
“authorized the use of force to protect the Kurds in Northern Iraq,” becoming the “first 
event of shifting politically from a policy of non-interference” (p. 1075). Traditionally, 
the intervention into one state’s internal affairs by another state was not an accepted 
practice, within the international order. T. H. Lee (2014) suggested that these types of 
actions were only taken when a state had a personal stake in the matter, and these states 
intervened only on “behalf of its citizens, who were at-risk, or on behalf of its allies, or to 
protect its property” (p. 235). As new crises occurred and the international order 
collapsed based on polarization, the concept known as humanitarian intervention 
emerged. The researcher examines this construct in the following section.  
Humanitarian Intervention 
There have been numerous attempts to define humanitarian intervention, but there 
is no consensus. Hood (2015) stated that although several scholars have attempted to 
define humanitarian interventions, “consensus for a universal definition has proven 




(a) The doctrine of humanitarian intervention is defined as the responsibility 
imposed on the international community to protect nationals of another state from 
inhumane and cruel treatment within their state, (b) Humanitarian intervention is 
meant to protect fundamental human rights in extreme circumstances; it is not 
meant to protect or promote civil and political rights, and (c) The use of armed 
force by a state (or states) to protect citizens of the target state from large-scale 
human rights violations there. (p. 616) 
In the context of the current study, the researcher used the working definition of 
humanitarian intervention by Blackford (2014), who defined humanitarian intervention as 
“the threat or use of force across state borders, without permission, by a state or a 
coalition of willing states, aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations 
of fundamental human rights” (p. 7).  
Humanitarian intervention emerged as the primary strategy to combat mass 
atrocities after the end of the Cold War. During the 1990s, several crises were deemed a 
threat to the security and peace of the international community. Gholiagha (2015) 
contended that the 1990s were characterized by both successes and failures to protect 
individual human beings from mass atrocities and severe human rights violations. In 
Kosovo, Rwanda, and Somalia, the UNSC adopted resolutions recognizing the need for 
interventions based on some type of humanitarian claim. Gholiagha (2015) further 
explained the following: 
Resolution 794 justified the use of force in Somalia on humanitarian claims. In 
Rwanda Resolutions 918 and 925 authorized UN assistance, but fell short to call 




In addition, in Bosnia, Resolution 819 which called for the protection of civilians 
in the town of Srebrenica, by establishing a safe haven, saw over 7000 men and 
boys killed. (p. 1076) 
These chains of events started when the UNSC decided to protect Kurdish 
civilians in Northern Iraq in 1992. Gholiagha (2015) found that Resolution 767, which 
was the first resolution that the security council avowed, ensured that “grave violations 
within country or severe emergencies can be evaluated as a threat to peace or 
international security” (p. 1075). Saddam Hussein used biological and chemical weapons 
on the Kurdish population, thereby causing gross violations of their right to be safe and 
secure. Nevertheless, these goodwill actions, did not come without consequences, which 
would eventually cause concern within the international community by some states. 
Gholiagha found that questions started to emerge from these humanitarian interventions 
by the international community and the focus was on consensus. Kosovo, which was a 
unilateral act led by NATO, was questioned because it lacked UNSC authorization. 
Somalia, where operation Restore Hope advanced humanitarian claims, was unanimously 
authorized by the UNSC, but was ran mostly as a NATO operation led by the United 
States. In Rwanda, there was little international political will, after the events in Somalia, 
and the reluctancy to intervene resulted in genocide against the Tutsis. Orford (2013) 
explained that humanitarian intervention is not a doctrine that “responsible states” wanted 
to adhere to because it was capable of “uncontrollable abuse” (p. 94). The looming issues 
among old rivals of the Cold War began to surface, calling into question the legality and 
legitimacy of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Orford explained that both the 




on behalf of their social ideological beliefs and were both met with skepticism and 
protest. In short, the literature has shown that some emerging states have identified 
humanitarian intervention, in terms of imperialism and colonialism. P. K. Lee and Chan 
(2016) surmised the following: 
Based on the history of abuse by Western powers during the ages of imperialism 
and colonialism, where Westphalian ideology of state centered sovereignty in 
international relations lie at the center of international relations, humanitarian 
intervention should not be used to impose regime change. Colonialism has had an 
adverse effect on the reaction, on the use force as an intervention tool, by China 
and India. Lee (2015) explained that through their historical trauma and post-
colonial colonial identity, “the use of force by powerful states against inferior 
states has caused China and India much consternation.” (p. 181) 
In Kosovo, Rwanda, and Somalia, the UNSC adopted resolutions recognizing the 
need for interventions based on some type of humanitarian claim. Resolution 794 
justified the use of force in Somalia on humanitarian claims. In Rwanda, Resolutions 918 
and 925 authorized UN assistance, but fell short to call the crisis a ‘genocide’ due to the 
reluctance of the United States and some European states. In addition, in Bosnia, 
Resolution 819—which called for the protection of civilians in the town Srebrenica by 
establishing a safe haven—resulted in the deaths of over 7,000 men and boys (Gholiagha, 
2015). In the next section, the researcher examines colonialism and the impact that it has 





Colonialism has had an adverse effect on the ideology of intervention by India 
and China. Having been victims of colonialism, both nations have frown upon using 
force to intervene in the internal affairs of other sovereign states. Ferdinand explained 
that both nations, having formed an Asian axis of sovereignty share similar views on 
national sovereignty and human rights, further stating that they “never” vote for 
resolutions or motions that are critical of human rights records by other states, calling 
them “high priority dissenters” (P. K. Lee & Chan, 2016, p. 386). Earlier, authors 
revealed several cases of humanitarian intervention after the end of the Cold War, mostly 
by Western powers who have some association with colonialism. China and India, due to 
prior experiences, tend to view these interventions in terms of their own interaction with 
the West. Miller (2013) explained their encounters with colonialism as a collective 
trauma, leading to a deeply ingrained mentality of victimhood and a resultant anti-
colonial post-imperial ideology. They have attributed their countries “past poverty, 
underdevelopment, social disorder, and violence to colonial exploitation and 
encroachment” (P. K. Lee & Chan, 2016, p. 180). Colonialism has had an adverse effect 
on the reaction of the use force as an intervention tool by China and India. P. K. Lee and 
Chan (2016) explained that through their historical trauma and postcolonial colonial 
identity, “the use of force by powerful states against inferior states has caused China and 
India much consternation” (p. 180). 
In sum, colonialism has influenced the ideological view of both China and India 




atrocities. Based on the history of their interactions with Western powers, both nations 
had an inferiority complex that led to their current ideology on intervention. P. K. Lee 
and Chan (2016) argued that present-day China and India would share a “national 
identity of post-colonial, re-emerging powers, that were not possessed by other BRICS 
nations” (p. 3). 
The UN Charter 
In this section, the researcher reviews the contestation generated by the UN 
Charter (1945) toward the R2P doctrine, as well as the semantics used to justify opposing 
points of views of scholars. Grover (2015) suggested the following: 
Here follows then a tentative, but perhaps in some ways audacious attempt at just 
such semantic gamesmanship in support of R2P as not only a viable Principe; but 
one which goes to the heart of the international rule of law, the intent and 
meaning of the UN Charter and the very credibility of the UN as a mechanism for 
the promotion of human rights and the achievement of international peace and 
security. (p. 1112) 
As revealed by Grover (2015), the literature was in support of using Article 2 of the UN 
Charter for using R2P as a mitigating factor to use force to stop mass atrocities in Syria. 
Grover suggested that implementing R2P by force, if necessary, is permissible under the 
means permissible per the UN Charter Article 2(4) as it served the purposes set out at 
Article (1) and (3) relating to safeguarding the rights and freedoms of the peoples of a 
state. These purposes underpinned the sovereignty of that state. Conversely, Stahn (2013) 




either the notion of self-defense or collective security (consensus within the UNSC). 
Regarding Syria, Stahn (2013) stated that humanitarianism was invoked as entitlement to 
justify action that is “punitive” in mature, outside the realm of self-defense or collective 
security. Grover (2015) and Stahn (2013) had opposing views on Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter (1945).  
Article 2(4) stated that all members should refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN (Grover, 
2015). Grover (2015) argued that the purposes of the UN were written in Article 1 of the 
UN Charter (1945). In Article 1, the UN Charter (1945) stated that to maintain 
international peace and security, collective measures should be taken to prevent threats 
and other breaches of peace, and these actions should be done in the conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law (p. 3). Grover (2015) argued that despite what 
Article 2(4) expressed in the form of refraining from using force against another state, 
using force in Syria would be inconsistent with the purposes of the UN. Grover suggested 
that in the UN Charter preamble—respecting the fundamental human rights of all human 
beings—may lead to war in certain circumstances. Grover suggested that armed force 
should not be used, saved for the common interest. Grover concluded that this focus on 
the “common interests” was justified in the semantics of Article 1 and Article 2. Grover 
(2015) explained the following: 
The threat to the Syrian people by the Assad regime triggers the pre-existing 
‘common interest’ to preserve and protect those human rights; and the fact that 




with the UN Charter purposes and principles which in fact includes protection of 
jus cogens norms including those related to fundamental human rights. (p. 1114) 
In contrast to Grover (2015), Stahn (2013) alleged that invoking the protection of 
fundamental human rights in Syria indicated the humanitarian intervention model is used 
to employ the use of force to protect civilians in Syria. Humanitarianism was invoked as 
entitlement to justify action that is “punitive” in nature, outside the realm of self-defense 
or collective security (Grover, 2015, pp. 1115–1117). Grover (2015) and Stahn (2013) 
differed in their interpretations of the UN Charter (1945) and using force. Stahn (2013) 
believed in the traditional manner of self-defense and authorization by the UNSC only in 
a collective manner to use force against another member. Conversely, Grover was willing 
to use keywords (i.e., common interests and purposes and principles) to broaden an 
interpretation of when using force could be justified.  
Overall, authors have discussed three points of contestations that divided the 
international community on using force. First, colonialism influenced the thinking of the 
BRICS nations—two of which hold veto power within the UNSC (China and Russia). P. 
K. Lee and Chan (2016) concluded the following: 
That the shared norm of opposing US hegemonic intervention with a hidden 
agenda of regime change is shaped by a “collective historical trauma” and “post-
imperial ideology” as a result of their painful colonization at the hands of Western 
imperialist powers between the eighteenth and twentieth century. (p. 20) 
After the end of the Cold War, humanitarian intervention emerged as the primary tool to 
combat mass atrocities regarding fundamental human rights issues. Somalia, Rwanda, 




intervening through force was justified under the humanitarian intervention model. 
Russia and China, however, became weary of the escalating unilateral action by the West. 
Plakoudas (2015) articulated that Putin is striving to transform the international system 
into a multipolar world where the United States will share power with Russia and other 
powers (e.g., China), rather than operate unilaterally. In addition, researchers have 
disclosed that the more powerful states in the West, led by the United States and its 
NATO allies, tend to see regime change as part of the intervention strategy, which only 
added to the skepticism of the BRICS. P. K. Lee and Chan (2016) explained that because 
of their 19th-century historical trauma and common postcolonial identities, powerful 
states’ use of force against inferior states has caused China and India much consternation.  
The literature showed the interpretation of the UN Charter (1945) has caused 
much contestation within the international community. Grover (2015) insisted that such 
“sematic gamesmanship” (p. 2) has life-or-death consequences. Conversely, Stahn (2013) 
argued that Article 2 indicated, “All members must refrain from using force or the threat 
of using force against any state or in any manner inconsistent with purposes of the United 
Nations” (as cited in Grover, 2015, pp. 1115–1117). The remaining debate lies in the 
interpretations of the purposes of the UN. 
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
The literature disclosed that the origins of R2P materialized from the 
humanitarian crisis that occurred in 1990s, such as Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia. These 
crises have shown the international community’s failures regarding taking appropriate 




people in developing countries would suffer if mass atrocities were committed and 
outsiders would refuse (or fail) to help, or if geopolitical or commercial interventions 
were disguised as humanitarian ones. In 2000, the Canadian government established the 
ICISS (2001). The Commission was directed to build a consensus to determine what the 
criteria should be for intervention. Discarding the humanitarian intervention label, the 
Commission introduced the concept of the R2P. Three components were introduced in 
outlining the concept: (a) Responsibility to Prevent, (b) Responsibility to React, and (c) 
Responsibility to Rebuild. The Commission sought to answer the questions on 
intervention being legitimate. Intervention shifted from a simple right to a right and a 
duty to intervene. The ICISS (2001) introduced six criteria for military intervention and 
established the UNSC as the ultimate authority to “legitimize such intervention” (p. 1); 
however, it did not exclude the possibility of regional organizations or a contingent of 
willing powers undertaking this action as well. The R2P emerged from the UN General 
Assembly (2005). Having evolved from the concepts of human security and humanitarian 
intervention, R2P became the talking point for the UN when it came to protecting 
civilians from mass atrocities. Nuruzzaman (2013) stated, “[The] theoretical significance 
of the R2P doctrine lies in initiating a paradigm shift from the right of intervention to an 
obligation to intervene” (p. 59).  
This review of the literature revealed the concept of challenging international 
beliefs and of using force as an intervention tool to protect civilian lives. Odeyemi (2016) 
professed extensive literature on R2P and Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa 
(BRICS) existed, but researchers had yet to engage in the discussion fully for success on 




the international military intervention in Libya was not about bombing for democracy or 
killing Muammar Gaddafi. Legally, morally, politically, and militarily, this action has 
only one justification: protecting the country’s people (Norooz, 2015). Continuing with 
the theme of lacking implementation strategies for using military force to intervene when 
protecting civilians—Pillar 3 of R2P—Bellamy (2014) explained the following: 
Together, these points suggest that while the use of force and other coercive 
measures against states remains controversial, the Security Council’s inability to 
reach consensus on a timely and decisive response to the crisis in Syria prior to 
2013 stemmed more from considerations derived from the situation in Syria itself 
than from more generalized opposition to RtoP provoked by the NATO-led 
intervention in Libya. (p. 27) 
Summary and Conclusions 
Responding with the use of force to address mass atrocities was at the heart of the 
R2P doctrine and is the most controversial of the three pillars. Morris (2013) claimed that 
even proposals for “soft” Pillar 3 responses to humanitarian crises might meet with 
Chinese and Russian disapproval—or at least acquiescence. Hood (2015) concluded that 
Article 2(1) of the UN Charter (1945) recognized that sovereignty was not an absolute 
bar to intervention if the underlying intent is to prevent human atrocities because human 
rights violations raised moral concerns and questions about the very legitimacy of that 
sovereignty (p. 613). Hood (2015) challenged those individuals who would argue that the 
UN Charter (1945) would call for nonintervention instead of the use of force. Grover 
(2015) analyzed the UN Charter (1945) by declaring support of R2P as not only a viable 




and meaning of the UN Charter, and the credibility of the UN as a mechanism for the 
promotion of human rights and the achievement of international peace and security. This 
debate was the major theme of the literature—using force as an intervention tool—where 
there was a lack of strategy, international will, and consensus over the evolving definition 
of sovereignty. Grillo and Pupcenoks (2017) tested whether people would believe that 
humanitarian interventions should be conducted on a multilateral basis and whether the 
United Nations should play a role in that process. The current researcher aimed to address 
the gap in literature and extend the knowledge in the discipline by examining the 
implementation of Pillar 3 when there is no consensus in the UNSC.  
In Chapter 3, the researcher provides details of the methodology used to conduct a 
qualitative research study to address the identified gap. Chapter 4 includes the results and 
the analysis of the data, implications for positive social change, and recommendations for 
future research. Finally, in Chapter 5, the researcher discusses the key points to consider 





Chapter 3: Research Method 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to examine the implementation of 
Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine in a crisis-related situation, such as Syria beginning in 2012. 
This investigation was vital, given that Syria is where mass atrocities continue to disrupt 
peace and security within the international arena. In addition, the researcher analyzed the 
complexities involved in achieving consensus within the UNSC on implementing Pillar 3, 
which allows for the use of military force to protect civilian populations from mass 
atrocities. The researcher examined the international system of order, where the UNSC is 
seen as the sole actor that maintains peace and security. In accordance with the UN 
Charter (1945), this process may be achieved using force, if necessary, to 
preserve/protect fundamental human rights based on common purposes and interests. 
Furthermore, the goal expanded on the policies and procedures that guide the UNSC’s 
decision-making process on using force to stop mass atrocities. This chapter contains the 
research methodology and design for the current study. The details include the 
participants, instruments, research procedures, data analysis, and ethical considerations. 
The researcher conducted this study to answer the following research questions: 
RQ1: Was the R2P applied consistently across all modern crisis-related human 
endeavors? 
RQ2: Did the application of R2P result in negative outcomes? 





Research Design and Rationale 
The researcher used a qualitative case study research design to analyze the 
complexities of the process of achieving consensus within the UNSC to implement Pillar 
3 and protect civilians in Syria from further mass atrocities. Grover (2015) explained how 
the use of veto power by some member states has allowed mass atrocities to continue. 
Furthermore, in order to use force to intervene in the internal affairs of a state, the 
international community requires the UNSC to collectively authorizes this action, either 
by voting for/against or abstaining. The accepted norm within the international 
community is not to intervene in the internal affairs of a state unless the state has been 
classified as failed/failing according to the first two principles of the R2P doctrine. At 
this point, the UNSC can be tasked to vote on a resolution to use force as an intervention 
tool; however, there must be a consensus where nine out of the 15 members vote in favor 
and there is no veto by a P5 member (Lappin, 2014, p. 143).  
The qualitative method allowed for the use a case study approach. The researcher 
analyzed the conditions that have led to mass atrocities in Syria and determined how the 
Syrian government has failed in its responsibility to protect its citizens. Furthermore, the 
researcher explored ways that each P5 member of the UNSC has found that Libyan 
civilians have fallen under the protection of Pillar 3—and not the civilians in Syria, even 
though they each seem at the same risk level for harm. Patton (2015) found that the first 
contribution of a qualitative inquiry would involve a researcher illuminating meanings 




Role of the Researcher 
The role of the researcher for this study was to choose the methodology and 
design that best enabled the study to be conducted in an accurate and credible way. The 
researcher chose a qualitative case study design as the best method. Patton (2015) stated 
that the first contribution of qualitative inquiry involves “illuminating meanings and how 
humans engage in meaning making- in essence, making sense of the world” (p. 5). As the 
primary research tool, the researcher used the R2P doctrine as the theoretical lens to 
conduct research, thereby examining the actions of the P5 members in the UNSC toward 
the crisis in Syria. In addition, the researcher employed the R2P doctrine to analyze the 
history and evolution of sovereignty and its impact on the international community, 
particularly for addressing mass atrocities and fundamental human rights with using force 
as an intervention tool. The primary unit of research included the P5 members of the 
UNSC, and their interactions and engagements with one another in exercising their 
responsibilities to maintain peace and security within the international community 
regarding mass atrocities.  
The researcher acquired the skills to conduct the research through numerous years 
of practical and professional experience with research. The researcher designed this 
qualitative case study according to the Institutional Review Board’s (IRB) regulations at 
Walden University. The researcher used numerous data bases from various sites/sources 
to collect and gather all the data needed. As an observer, the researcher analyzed the 
voting records of the P5 members on resolutions put forth by the UN and UNSC to 




documents to identify the actions of each permanent member of the UNSC regarding the 
use of their veto power and implementing Pillar 3 in Syria.  
The current researcher had no personal or professional relationships with the 
participants (P5 members). The participants were representatives of their respective 
countries and were assumed to be responsible to their respective governments. Any 
personal biases were stated up front in this study and allowed the researcher to own his 
perspective, according to Rudestam and Newton (2015). As stated earlier, there were not 
any issues with power relationships in this study. The researcher did not have any direct 
contact with any of the participants, and only used secondary data to determine the policy 
beliefs/actions of each participant about using force in Syria to protect the civilian 
population that is at risk for further acts of mass atrocities.  
The other potential risks of this study were founded in the institutional bias of the 
UNSC, where ideology and alliances skewed documents and other information to fit 
narratives of the P5, where contestation exists. These risks included participant biases 
(e.g., strategic interests), institutional biases (e.g., the UN’s push to normalize the R2P 
doctrine), documents, videos, and websites. These risks may have been purposefully 
written to skew the reported results and prove that the use force in Syria is a viable option 
in preventing further suffering and harm to the civilian population. 
Participant Selection Logic 
The population for this study was comprised of the five permanent security 
council members: United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. Although 
the UNSC has 15 members at any given time, these five members are the only nations 




permanent members are endowed with veto power; thus, they can prevent any action or 
resolution on collective intervention, as part of the R2P doctrine. The criteria for the 
population in this study was to have veto power within the UNSC, and only the five 
permanent members have this power. The rationalization for examining this population 
was that it only takes one member to prevent the use of collective action or obtaining a 
consensus. A comparison-focused sampling strategy was used to review voting records, 
analyze video interviews, and examine the strategic interests of each P5 member. The 
researcher observed and examined websites and documents that supported each 
participant’s view on using force in Syria to protect civilians. Syria was the only case 
study used in this dissertation. Syria was a classic case for Pillar 3, based on the criteria 
set forth in the R2P doctrine; however, Pillar 3 was not implemented, even though Syria 
met all the stated criteria.  
For the procedures in this study, the researcher used online research to identify 
and analyze each participants actions, statements, and other relevant behaviors on UNSC 
resolutions on the crisis in Syria beginning in 2012. Saturation occurred when the 
researcher collected all the information on implementing Pillar 3 in Syria, where only the 
members of UNSC were viewed as having legal and legitimate authority to collectively 
use force to intervene in the Syrian crisis. 
Instrumentation 
The collected data consisted of observation sheets, videos, and websites where 
NGOs such as the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and the Canadian 
Centre for the Responsibility to Protect have promoted the implementation of Pillar 3 for 




analyzed. Observation methods of a non-participatory nature were used to examine and 
analyze all information related to the UNSC and the use of force in Syria. The researcher 
used a researcher produced observation sheet to analyze voting records on proposed 
resolutions by the UN on Syria. In addition, the researcher used sources from three 
NGOs: (a) the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2019), (b) the Canadian 
Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (n.d.), and (c) the International Coalition for the 
Responsibility to Protect (n.d.). These sources contain videos, interviews, and 
presentations on the UNSC and implementing Pillar 3 in Syria. Finally, the UNSC was 
used as a source to examine the collective actions of the P5 members on their individual 
actions on the Syrian crisis. For the data collection instruments, the researcher used all 
the data sources to answer the research questions by showing the complexities within the 
system of the UNSC, which did not allow for consensus to be achieved to use force as a 
resolution in Syria. The researcher assumed that by using multiple data collection 
methods (i.e., triangulation), and validity measures, the content was established. The 
researcher used multiple streams of data collection and triangulation to answer the 
research question, which contributed to alignment, as well as with reliability and ethical 
issues. Finally, the researcher used a qualitative method to attach personal quality to the 
research through reflexivity and evaluation. 
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
As previously mentioned, data were collected from the voting records of the 
permanent members of the UNSC with veto power. These records were available through 
multiple sources online, as well as on the UN website. The data were made available for 




has vetoed 12 resolutions on Syria. Only five permanent members of the UNSC exist: 
France, United Kingdom, China, Russia, and the United States. These P5 members are 
the only members with veto power, and therefore comprised the entire population. Based 
on this criterion, this population supplied all the necessary data needed to conduct the 
study. The researcher used multiple sources of secondary data for triangulation: The 
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, the Canadian Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect, the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, the 
ICISS, the UNSC, and the UN General Assembly. The researcher examined these sources 
of secondary data to find the policy actions and beliefs of the P5 members on using force 
as a policy tool to prevent/stop mass atrocity crimes in Syria. Through informed research, 
the researcher also found that qualitative sampling was small and purposeful. Patton 
(2015) explained that qualitative inquiry typically focuses on relatively small samples, 
even single cases. In sampling purposefully, the researcher intentionally selected a 
sample to improve the focus on what was being studied, thereby strengthening the 
research. The duration of data collection continued until the researcher reached saturation 
from the examination of the various sources. The researcher used a purposive strategy to 
collect the data. Patton suggested that the logic and power of purposeful sampling lies in 
selecting information rich cases for in-depth analysis. The sample size of this strategy 
depended on the purpose of the study, the questions, and the design. All did align to focus 
the study and provide information that was thick and rich. According to Patton (2015), 
“Purposeful sampling is when information rich cases shine a light on the questions being 
studied” (p. 264). Small sample sizes in a qualitative study are often essential, as the 




out that data for a qualitative study could include virtually anything that a researcher 
might see, hear, or that is otherwise communicate to a researcher while conducting the 
study. A large sample size, coupled with large amounts of data, would not have provided 
the rich thick information needed with purposeful sampling. 
Patton (2015) articulated that qualitative inquiry has no rules for sample size, and 
it depends on “what you know, what is the purpose, the stakes, the usefulness, the 
credibility, and available time and resources” (p. 3). The current researcher employed a 
criteria-based strategy of the population for all the data. The population was comprised of 
the five permanent security council members with veto power: United States, United 
Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. The researcher used a criteria-based strategy to 
analyze all available voting records, the members’ ideological beliefs, as well as their 
geopolitical self-interests to either employ or not to employ the mechanisms of Pillar 3 to 
protect the civilian population in Syria, even though they have been employed in Libya. 
The Syrian case was examined in-depth, and the emergent theory of the R2P was used to 
analyze the conditions that have led to Syria being labeled as a failed state under the R2P 
premise. In addition, the Libyan case was examined briefly to compare why the UNSC 
invoked Pillar 3 in Libya and not in Syria, despite many similarities.  
The researcher selected cases to compare and to learn about the factors that 
explained the similarities and differences of each case, as it relates to R2P (Patton, 2015). 
One of the many important aspects of a qualitative research study is the collection of 
data. Creswell (2013) noted that qualitative researchers often “learn by doing” (p. 6). The 
entire process was iterative, and the data collection was “custom built, revised, and 




employed strategies to organize, collect, manage, and store this information in 
completing the dissertation process more efficiently. The researcher used coding as the 
primary strategy for this project.  
The researcher used coding to develop themes/patterns to create categories on 
voting for members of the UNSC. Coding is the process by which qualitative researchers 
describe and assign value to the data. Creswell (2013) argued that forming codes or 
categories represents the heart of qualitative data analysis. Coding involves taking the 
data and forming smaller categories of descriptive information. Qualitative coding 
involves the use of a word or a short phrase that summarizes the data. Coding was the 
critical link between data collection and their explanation of meaning (Creswell, 2013). 
The researcher used evaluation coding as a first cycle coding method to determine the 
ideology of each P5 member, and how this has influenced their perspectives on using 
force to protect the sovereignty, regarding fundamental human rights and dignity of 
civilians in Syria. Coding was used to evaluate the members’ voting records on Syrian 
resolutions in the UN. The researcher used pattern codes and themes, specifically 
causes/explanations, as a second coding strategy to summarize the findings. 
Data Analysis Plan 
The researcher used secondary data as the main source of information gathering. 
Rudestam and Newton (2015) articulated that secondary data constitute a valid source of 
data for a research study, and many excellent studies have been conducted using data that 
has previously been collected. Those sources of secondary data comprise online 
resources, such as the United Nations Department of Public Information; the United 




and Archive Unit; NGOs (e.g., the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and the 
Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect); documents (e.g., the UN Charter and 
the World Summit Outcome Document); and resolutions from the UNSC, where each 
member of the population had a record of their votes on military intervention in crises 
like Syria. In addition to obtaining voting records, there were existing video interviews, 
conferences on R2P recorded and available for viewing, recorded meetings on UNSC 
conferences/meetings, and a wealth of other documents and digital sources from these 
secondary sources.  
Coding is a process used to organize and make sense of large amounts of 
qualitative data (Creswell, 2013). Data analysis in qualitative research comprises a 
researcher preparing and organizing the data for analysis; then reducing the data into 
themes through a process of coding and condensing the codes; and finally representing 
the data in figures, tables, or a discussion. Creswell defined coding as the process by 
which qualitative researchers would describe and assign value to the data. In addition, 
Creswell found that forming codes or categories is the goal of qualitative data analysis, 
and when engaged in coding, the researcher is interpreting and analyzing the data. 
The researcher employed this strategy to analyze and explain the data to answer 
the research questions by considering similar words and phrases to examine whether 
those member states were consistent in their themes when voting on resolutions on cases 
other than Syria, or whether their tone differs with each case and their voting position 
changes, despite similar conditions. The researcher used journaling to record observations 
made while reviewing video content, interviews conducted by NGOs and other 




publicly available. The researcher also coded the observational notes from journaling by 
looking for similarities and differences in words and phrases in each case and comparing 
them with Syria. 
In sum, the researcher used secondary data as the main source of gathering 
information for the study. The researcher employed two coding strategies to analyze, 
describe, and explain the data: descriptive and analytical/theoretical coding. In 
descriptive coding, the researcher described what was in the data, and during 
analytical/theoretical coding, the researcher developed codes about why what was 
occurring in the data might be happening (Gibbs & Taylor, 2005). These two coding 
methods allowed the researcher the best opportunity to describe, analyze, organize, 
explain, and interpret the data. The researcher used the available tools provided by NVivo 
software during the research process. Additionally, the researcher purchased two external 
hard drives to store all the research data and serve as the primary backups. The researcher 
stored the research throughout a digital network created through the years (i.e., multiple 
computer devices, desktop, laptop, and tablet; multiple storage devices, internal drives, 
external drives, and USB drives; and cloud storage and email). These strategies enabled 
the researcher to complete the data collection and analysis process effectively and 
efficiently. 
Reliability  
Rudestam and Newton (2015) suggested that reliability concerns the replicability 
of the study under similar circumstances. The researcher used secondary data that can be 




Additionally, coding was used to find themes and patterns that arrive at similar 
conclusions (Rudestam & Newton, 2015). 
To ensure trustworthiness or reliability, the researcher used triangulation. 
Maxwell (2013) defined triangulation as collecting data from a diverse range of 
individuals and settings, using a variety of methods. The researcher mentioned multiple 
sources used above (i.e., UN website, videos, and NGOs), as well as specific methods for 
collecting the data (purposeful and comparison focuses sampling) and saturation of the 
data collected. Additionally, reflexivity and reactivity were used to address the 
researcher’s bias. These biases were stated up-front for the audience to know and 
understand. Maxwell explained that eliminating the researcher’s influence is impossible, 
but the goal is to understand this influence and use it productively. Finally, the researcher 
used prolonged contact or intensive, long-term involvement while engaged in the 
observation of the data, videos, interviews conducted online by secondary sources, and 
other documents. The researcher observed these repeatedly to determine the varying 
viewpoints of different experts on the R2P theory. 
Validity 
Rudestam and Newton (2015) stated that “all research bears the responsibility of 
convincing oneself and the intended audience that the findings are based on critical 
inquiry” (p. 131). The process of validation involves presenting a thoroughly sound 
research study that is grounded in reliable and credible information. In this study, the 
researcher measured validity in terms of the transferability, dependability, and 





Creswell (2013) defined validation as the process of evaluating 
trustworthiness, reported observations, interpretations, and generalizations. In 
addition, validating an argument or research process means showing it is well 
founded and sound, whether the results can be generalized to a larger group. 
Conversely, when a procedure or result is reliable, it means that researchers can 
depend on it (i.e., rely on it).  
The researcher used rich data to provide a detailed analysis of the R2P doctrine, 
specifically Pillar 3. Thick description implies the description of behavior as well as the 
context that gives it meaning (Creswell, 2013, p. 133). Thus, the descriptions of the 
participants or setting under study was sufficiently detailed to allow for transferability to 
other settings. The collection of data provided a full picture of the complexities 
encountered by the UNSC to implement force in Syria. The researcher used a literary 
review matrix for literature collected during the study, and a journal for notetaking for 
analyzing videos and websites as secondary data. The researcher used numbers when 
examining the voting records of the population. Maxwell (2013) suggested that numbers 
can be used to report quasi-statistics, or simple numerical results. Using numbers is an 
important quality of the research to analyze the ideological policy beliefs of the 






To achieve dependability, the researcher used the criteria of adequacy and 
appropriateness of the data. The researcher collected, analyzed, and defined data through 
saturation. Rudestam and Newton (2015) referred to this process as “adequacy” (p. 133). 
The researcher used multiple sources of data to achieve saturation (i.e., voting records of 
the P5 members of the UNSC, websites that promote R2P, videos, and other documents). 
The researcher used triangulation to ensure dependability. The researcher cross-checked 
and corroborated R2P regarding Syria through different NGOs that have promoted the 
use of R2P in Syria. The researcher used the Global Centre for the Responsibility to 
Protect, the Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, and the European Center 
for the Responsibility to Protect to cross-check and corroborate information and data on 
Syria and R2P. Lastly, the researcher used first and second coding to produce reflective 
journaling notes. 
Confirmability 
To ensure confirmability, the researcher employed strategies such as reflexivity, 
and contradictions that have resulted in intensive research. Rudestam and Newton (2015) 
defined reflexivity as the critical self-reflection component that illuminates the 
researcher’s potential biases and assumptions. The researcher kept personal notes on his 
thoughts and observations during the study about the potential effects of the data. Finally, 
the researcher used triangulation to examine the pros and cons of the R2P doctrine by 
using multiple sources. These sources have shown different perspectives of using Pillar 3 




achieve an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of implementing Pillar 3 in 
Syria. Throughout the research, the complexities of implementing or achieving consensus 
in the UNSC was discussed, as well as the contradictions of implementing R2P in Libya 
and not in Syria. Finally, all data were gathered from secondary sources and confirmed 
through online websites, documents, organizations, and video interviews. 
Ethical Procedures 
The purpose of the IRB was to assure that the potential benefits of the research, 
outweigh the potential risks. In addition, the IRB assures the researcher was in full 
compliance with all relevant regulations and laws (Rudestam & Newton, 2015). The IRB 
ensures that the stakeholders fully consent and are fully informed about any ethical issues 
or concerns that could potentially be harmful (Rudestam & Newton, 2015). This 
researcher examined the policy and procedures of the R2P as it relates to the third pillar 
of the Secretary General's 2009 report (A/63/677; UN General Assembly, 2005). The 
researcher examined the conditions in Syria to see why the UN Security Council, due to 
multitude of complexities, did not authorize using force in this case, but authorized the 
use of force in the Libyan case, despite similar conditions.  
The ethical issues of this study primarily reflect the researcher’s bias and 
influence toward the data. Merriam (2014) explained that clarifying researcher bias from 
the outset of the study was important so that the reader understands the researcher's 
position or any biases or assumptions that impact the inquiry. To address this bias, the 
researcher took a holistic account of the data. Creswell (2013) explained that by 
identifying the many factors and complexities of using force as an intervention tool in 




throughout the study by examining, analyzing, and reporting the many sides of the Pillar 
3/R2P debate. Furthermore, the researcher used inductive and deductive logic to analyze 
all data. 
The researcher determined that the risks included, but were not limited to, the 
assumption of bias due to P5 ideology, geopolitical interests, and history on nation-state 
sovereignty versus fundamental human rights. Finally, there were ethical concerns due to 
institutional bias, where documents, videos, and websites have been purposefully skewed 
to reflect member states’ ideology and geopolitical interests. These interests reported 
results to show the use of force was/was not a viable intervention tool to combat mass 
atrocities. The benefit of this study expanded or improved the decision-making process, 
current policy, and selection to implement Pillar 3 to protect civilian populations who 
were at risk of mass human atrocities.  
To make sure that this study passed the initial IRB review, the researcher ensured 
alignment with Walden's IRB requirements by carefully going over each section of the 
IRB application. In addition, the researcher completed the required course work from 
CITI to use secondary data for the research study. Because of the nature of the study, 
ethical concerns for human participants were not applicable. Furthermore, because all 
data collected were already published for public view, there were no ethical 
considerations for protection or confidentiality. The researcher enhanced the 
confidentiality of the results by using multiple internal/external storage devices, as well 





In Chapter 3, the researcher discussed the methodology of the study, including the 
techniques that guided data collection and data analysis. This chapter also included a 
discussion of the researcher’s role, the population, and the instrumentation, as well as the 
procedures to ensure credibility, dependability, validity, and transferability. Chapter 4 
includes a discussion of the results of the data analysis. In Chapter 5, the researcher 
presents implications for social change and recommendations for future research based 





Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to examine the implementation of 
Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine. Pillar 3 is an intervention tool used by the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC), when all peaceful means have been exhausted in a crisis-
related situation, such as in Syria during 2012 (Grover, 2015; Kolmašová, 2016; 
Vanhullebusch, 2015). This goal is important to address, because Syria has experienced 
mass atrocities that continue to disrupt peace and security within the international arena. 
As defined in the UN Charter and in accordance with the R2P doctrine, Pillar 3 
measures are a last resort option to maintain or restore peace and security within the 
international community. For this research, the research questions were leveraged to 
address the research problem, as follows:  
RQ1: Was R2P applied consistently across all modern crisis-related human 
endeavors? 
RQ2: Did the application of R2P result in negative outcomes? 
RQ3: Would a historically consistent application of R2P help alleviate the crisis 
in  Syria? 
In Chapter 3, the research design, rationale, validity, and ethical and 
methodological considerations were explored and presented. In Chapter 4, the 
researcher presents an in-depth discussion of the research setting, demographics, data 
collection, and data analysis process. The data collection details include the collection 
and analysis procedures used to evaluate actions of the P5 members in the UNSC, the 




specifically, the implementation of Pillar 3. Additionally, the researcher examined 
relevant existing data on Syria, R2P, and the UN/UNSC resolutions from 2015-2020. 
The researcher also highlights categories/codes, themes, and patterns that were revealed 
through the analysis and coding process using a software package, Nvivo 12. Finally, 
this chapter includes a detailed discussion of the results of this study and how these 
results helped to answer the research questions and research problem.  
Setting 
For this study, the researcher used a purposeful criterion sampling strategy to 
collect data from the five permanent members of the UNSC (P5) because they have veto 
power. This veto power enables each of the permanent five members to nullify any 
resolutions or actions proposed by the UNSC. The research was conducted using 
secondary data to answer the research questions; therefore, there were no direct factors or 
influences effecting the population, or the results that were analyzed and interpreted. 
Upon receiving approval from the Walden Institutional Review Board (IRB), the 
researcher began the online collection of data from the five permanent members of the 
UNSC on resolutions concerning the crisis in Syria, beginning in 2012. Additionally, data 
was collected from three NGO’s, who specialize in R2P. Other online sources were used 
that provided videos, interviews, and documents related to answering the research 
questions. Finally, the researcher used additional online websites such as the Global 
Policy Forum and the Global Center on Cooperative Security to collect, examine, and 






The researcher selected a criterion-based purposeful sampling strategy to identify 
the members of the UNSC that could single handedly prevent the UNSC from acting in a 
decisive manner (employing force) to prevent or stop mass atrocities. The UNSC is 
constructed around the P5 (permanent members of the UNSC). As previously mentioned, 
the P5 is comprised of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. 
These five nations were allies during World War II, and they possess the world’s top five 
nuclear arsenals. Because each of these nations are endowed with the power to 
unilaterally reject any proposed resolutions or actions put forth by the UNSC, and thus 
nullify any attempts at consensus (i.e., veto power), they were the focus of this study. The 
researcher examined the Libyan crisis as a source of reference because it is the only case 
on record to employ Pillar 3 through a consensus in the UNSC. All the data collected for 
this study revolved around these five nations which held veto power. The researcher 
collected data from experts on R2P, NGOs, and other documents pertaining to R2P.  
The implementation of Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine is solely dependent on the P5 
members coming to a consensus. Figure 1 shows the deep division within the UNSC, 
particularly the P5, at the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2012. The chart not only shows 
the failure of the UNSC to adopt a resolution condemning the Assad regime of violently 
suppressing anti-government demonstrators, but it previews how the division within the 
UNSC continues to this day, preventing the implementation of R2P, and resulting in the 






UNSC Voting Members on UN Resolution in 2012 
 
Note. Retrieved from https://govindicators.org. 
 In addition to collecting data from the P5, data were also collected from three 
NGOs that advocated for and employed experts on the R2P doctrine. These were the 
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, the Canadian Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect, and the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect. 
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to protect was established in 2008, and its 
mission statement is to make R2P a reality by advocating and advancing R2P around 
three specific principles: (a) clarifying R2P, (b) advocating for R2P implementation, and 
(c) strengthening and institutionalizing R2P (GCR2P, 2019). The Canadian Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect (n.d.) is based out of the University of Toronto; it is “a non-
profit, non-partisan research organization which aims to promote scholarly engagement 
and political implementation of the R2P principle” (http://ccr2p.org/mandate, para. 1). 




by representatives of eight regional and international NGOs; their mission is to bring 
together coalitions of NGOs, regionally and internationally, to promote consensus for 
R2P. 
 Dr. Simon Adams, Executive Director at the Global Centre for the Responsibility 
to Protect and an expert on the R2P doctrine, conducted online video interviews, spoke at 
conferences on R2P and the Syrian Crisis, and published articles on R2P, where his 
analysis and expertise contributed to answering the research questions, while addressing 
the research problem. The Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, the 
International Crisis Group, the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, 
and the Global Policy Forum each published articles, held conferences, and participated 
in international events focusing on the R2P doctrine. Additionally, each NGO 
participated at conferences held by the UN General Assembly on the importance of R2P 
and its role in protecting vulnerable populations to maintain international peace and 
security. 
Data Collection 
After receiving approval from the IRB (01-23-20-0151870), the researcher began 
the collection of secondary data by examining sources online. The researcher started with 
searching the UN website for all available articles, videos, and previously recorded 
interviews and conferences that pertained to Syria and the R2P doctrine. Upon examining 
the UN website, the researcher found a link that specifically referenced the UNSC, and 
then searched the UNSC page for resolution pertaining to Syria. Several resolutions were 
found, but the researcher focused on those from the past 5 years. The researcher 




collective forceful action under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 2209 condemns any use of chemicals as a weapon in the 
Syrian Civil War and threatens to use force if chemical weapons are used again in the 
conflict. The resolution was passed with 14 in favor, with one abstention from Venezuela 
(UN Security Council, 2015). The representative from Venezuela stated: 
 
He had abstained because the vote prejudged the results of the ongoing OPCW 
investigation.  That inquiry should first conclude, to determine 
responsibility.  Syria was a victim of armed groups that fueled hatred and 
violence, and that also had major military capacity (www.un.org, 2015, para. 6). 
 
The researcher continued to conduct an exhaustive search for resolutions related 
to Syria and R2P (Pillar 3) from 2015 to 2020 but could not find any other resolutions 
that addressed the use of force as a viable option or discussed any military options under 
chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The researcher used Resolution 2209 as the lone indicator 
for analyzing the UNSC and how they approached the use of force as an intervention tool 
in Syria. In addition to searching for Syrian resolutions on the UN website, the researcher 
used the Google Scholar search engine to search for Syrian resolutions by the UN/UNSC 
from other online sources, including documents, charts and tables, and videos. The 
researcher examined and analyzed 16 resolutions from 2015 to 2020 that were voted on 
in the UNSC concerning Syria. Outside of Resolution 2209, mentioning Chapter 7 
options for using chemical weapons by the Assad regime against Syrian civilians, 




terrorism within Syria. This call to action, however, was not deemed a collective 
organized military action under Pillar 3. Figure 2, retrieved from the UNSC website, 
illustrates the most recent resolutions that have prompted the use of veto power by each 
of the P5 members. 
Figure 2 
Issues that have Prompted the Most Vetoes in the UNSC 
 
 
When Syria is the lone issue, Russia and China have used their veto power exclusively. 
Figure 2 also demonstrates the deep political/ideological divide within the UNSC and 
why consensus on R2P/Pillar 3 has been an impossible conclusion. Additionally, the 
division within the UNSC is displayed in Figure 2, where it shows Russia and China are 
aligned on most of the issues presented in Figure 2, and the U.S., France, and the U.K. 
are also aligned. The polarization of the UNSC, as stated early in the study between those 




existent, particularly on issue dealing with Syria, where Russia and China are the only 
nations to use their veto. 
Next, the researcher searched previously mentioned NGO website for interviews, 
statements, conferences, and other documents created by experts. Dr. Simon Adams of 
the GCR2P spoke at several conferences held on R2P and conducted interviews on the 
doctrine, specifically mentioning the Syrian Crisis and the need for the international 
community to fulfill its responsibilities to the Syrian people using the guidelines of R2P. 
Additionally, several published videos, articles, and statements were found on the 
UN/UNSC websites where the failures of R2P were examined and discussed amongst 
experts. The pros and cons of military intervention, the impact of Russian and Chinese 
veto’s in Syria, the lessons learned from intervening in Libya, and the future of R2P were 
the subjects analyzed. Furthermore, the websites of the following were to collect data: the 
Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, the International Crisis Group, the 
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, and the Global Policy Forum, all 
provided critical information on the Syrian crisis and R2P. Some of this information 
included comments and analysis on R2P from previous UN Secretary General’s Ban Ki-
moon and Kofi Annan, as well as current Secretary General Antonio Guterres. The case 
for military intervention was examined, along with the legal foundations of intervening 
under R2P in a nation with a recognizable functioning government. Finally, data was 
collected and analyzed on the general philosophy of R2P moving forward. Preventive 
diplomacy was examined by Dr. Adams where he focused in on the first two principles of 
R2P, when conducting interviews. Articles that emphasized R2P 2020, where UN 




Resist; End Impunity; and Empower.  The researcher concentrated on those secondary 
sources that referenced R2P, Syria, and Libya. However, the researcher did find several 
videos and other documents with experts discussing the failure of the UNSC to take 
appropriate action pertaining to R2P in Syria. Finally, the researcher analyzed documents 
that outlined and discussed military intervention, preventive diplomacy, and the 
selectivity of using or implementing Pillar 3. 
Data Analysis Plan 
As previously mentioned earlier in this study, Creswell (2013) stated that data 
generated by qualitative methods are voluminous and can be overwhelming. As indicated 
earlier in the data analysis plan in Chapter 3, the researcher used NVivo 12 to assist with 
collecting, organizing, coding, and storing the data for this study. NVivo was used as the 
primary mechanism to analyze, code, and determine themes/categories/patterns. 
Additionally, all videos, documents, interviews, and observations were imported to 
NVivo, where they were assigned a category by file name, and subsequently analyzed 
under nodes created by the researcher to code the data. 
The researcher then coded the data using the coding tool under NVivo 12 by 
creating nodes to describe the data. Miles et al. (2014) suggested that “a descriptive code 
assigns labels to data to summarize in a word or short phrase…eventually providing an 
inventory of topics for indexing and categorizing” (p. 73). Each node was given a name 
to code the data. The researcher created five nodes to code the data, where the researcher 
looked for similar words, phrases, and ideological beliefs on sovereignty, human rights, 
intervention, and R2P. The researcher then analyzed the documents by highlighting, 




each node and then were coded. Additionally, the researcher transcribed the videos where 
experts from NGOs were interviewed or were discussing R2P as part of a 
panel/conference. The researcher created observation sheets on some of the videos and 
photos where there was no narrator. Finally, the researcher used NVivo 12 to create word 
trees, word clusters, and charts from the data. This data included the using key words and 
phrases such as: Syrian resolutions, failure of R2P, humanitarianism, military 
intervention in Syria, UNSC and R2P, UNSC and Libya, UNSC and Syria, R2P, the 
Responsibility to Protect, UN mandates on military intervention, UNSC voting patterns 
on R2P, and the UN Charter and R2P. Observations sheets were created from the analysis 
of videos, articles, and documents found on various websites, including GCR2P, and the 
CCR2P: (1) The ACT Code of Conduct and the UN Security Council, (2) R2P 5 years 5 
vetoes, Simon Adams on R2P, Syria, and the reform of the Security Council, (3) Syria: 
Nine Years of Atrocities, Impunity, and Inaction, and (4) 6 key point of military 
intervention in Syria.s 
 The five nodes/codes are as follows. Under the node of UN/UNSC resolutions 
from 2015-2020, the researcher was looking for all the resolutions that were brought forth 
on the Syrian crisis during this specified time-period. The researcher found 11 such 
resolutions that addressed the crisis in Syria. As previously mentioned in the Data 
Collection Section, only two of those resolutions—2118 and 2209—directly mentioned 
any collective action under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, thus suggesting implementing 
Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine. Under the node of military intervention, the researcher 
imported documents, charts, videos, and articles discussing or examining calls for and 




interview and analysis of experts concerning the R2P doctrine. The researcher examined 
the NGOs’ websites, UN/UNSC conferences on R2P, and videos interviewing Dr. Simon 
Adams, Kofi Anan, and others who spoke to the principles of R2P, and the complexities 
of implementing the R2P doctrine. Under the fourth node, international peace and 
security, the researcher examined data that discussed the purposes of the UN, as the 
accepted entity of the international community, that has the legal, legitimate, and moral 
authority to maintain peace and security. Finally, the use of diplomacy was examined 
within the data to justify if the use of force was warranted under Pillar 3 of the R2P 
doctrine. Pillar 3 is a last-resort option, as stated in the doctrine of R2P, and all measures 
of diplomacy should be exhausted before measures under Pillar 3 are considered by the 
UN/UNSC.  
In summary, the researcher created five nodes to code all the data collected and 
analyzed to answer the research questions. The node/codes were placed into categories, 
where themes/patterns were revealed. These themes/patterns consisted of: (a) the use of 
veto power by P5 members in the UNSC to protect their national interests; (b) the failure 
of R2P, specifically in Libya and the effects of implementing pillar 3 after Libya; and (c) 
inaction by the UNSC in Syria based on the failures in Libya.  
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
Patton (2015) declared that the challenge of qualitative analysis lies in making 
sense of massive amounts of data; therefore, in this qualitative case study design, the 
researcher employed triangulation strategies to analyze the secondary data that was 
examined from all available online sources listed in chapter 2. The researcher shared the 




experts, and summations of observations/transcripts). The researcher examined and 
analyzed secondary data from multiple sources and specified the methods for collecting 
the data until determining that saturation had occurred. Finally, the researcher engaged in 
an exhaustive and prolonged research of the data, including watching/observing videos, 
reading documents, taking notes on interviews by experts on R2P, and analyzing 
resolutions from the UNSC/UN on R2P. This was repeatedly done in an intensive manner 
to experience different points of views on R2P.  
Transferability  
The researcher provided thick description of the data, first by coding the data 
collected to develop themes by associating themes, which were used to answer each 
research question. The data collected painted a full picture of the complexities involved 
in achieving consensus within the UNSC to implement Pillar 3. The researcher used all 
the resources stated in Chapter 3 and did not deviate from the research methodology; 
therefore, transferability remains viable.  
Dependability 
The researcher achieved saturation of the data through the coding process. The 
researcher collected, analyzed, defined, and coded the data until themes/patterns were 
revealed in the results, and repeated. Multiple sources were used from online resources 
(e.g., UNSC/UN websites, NGO websites, online interviews, conferences, videos, other 
documents). Triangulation was implemented to ensure dependability (interviews by 
different experts, different perspectives of using force as an intervention tool, and 




and the results were shared through tables, charts, quotes, and experts’ analysis. First and 
second coding techniques were used to determine nodes within NVivo, which helped to 
analyze the data and provide themes. Finally, the researcher used journaling and 
transcription to create tables summarizing the findings. 
Confirmability 
The researcher ensured confirmability by utilizing the strategies stated in Chapter 
3. The researcher used multiple sources to reveal the results provided by the data. Pillar 3 
was analyzed and examined by all relevant secondary sources from the UNSC, experts, 
NGOs, and all other documents related to R2Pin the modern era. Different perspectives 
were reported in the results, as evidenced in the tables, charts, and quotes presented in the 
findings. Also, the researcher examined Libya as the sole case of implementing Pillar 3 
by the UNSC. The Libyan case was used to examine the complexities of applying R2P, 
which have resulted in inaction in Syria, despite their similarities. Finally, the data 
reported in the results are from all the secondary sources stated throughout the study and 
are therefore confirmable through those online resources. 
 
Results 
The results of this study are presented in the sections below. The findings from 
the data are separated according to each research question, and the themes that were 
revealed from the coding of the data are presented using the previously mentioned 




revealed three major themes, mentioned above, that were purposefully organized by the 
researcher to align each research question with each theme. 
Research Question 1 
RQ1 asked: Was R2P applied consistently across all modern crisis-related 
human endeavors? The theme that emerged to answer this question, was the constant 
use of the P5’s veto power—particularly the United States, Russia, and China—to 
protect their national interests/security. First, the researcher would like to define, for 
this study, the timeline for R2P in terms of modern crisis-related human endeavors. 
Earlier in this paper, the researcher mentioned the crises of the 1990s. These crises, 
which included Kosovo and Rwanda, were undertaken under the banner of 
Humanitarian Intervention (HI) Although R2P evolved from HI, the R2P doctrine 
established principles that held nation-states primarily responsible for the protection of 
their citizens. Sovereignty is seen as two-fold (state versus the individual). 
Humanitarian Intervention placed emphasis on nation-states rights, while R2P places an 
emphasis on individual rights, and, therefore, challenges the old norms of sovereignty 
when it comes to addressing mass atrocities. Dr. Simon Adams (2017) articulated the 
following: 
I do not believe in humanitarian intervention. There was a lot of time, political 
sweat, pain, and suffering behind the great humanitarian intervention debates of 
the 1990’s. R2P essentially came out of the attempt to develop concepts and 




important point of distinction. I do not think the two are interchangeable. R2P 
transcends humanitarian intervention. (pp. 1-2) 
Additionally, Lopez (2015) stated that humanitarian intervention, which involves the use 
of armed force to protect civilians at risk of mass crimes, has generated a great deal of 
controversy due to major failures in the 1990s and questions regarding the effectiveness, 
motivations, legality, and legitimacy of interventions (p. 122). For the purposes of 
analyzing and interpreting the results of this study, the R2P framework is only applicable 
to those crises that meet the criteria of the four core mass atrocity crimes (genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing), after the 2005 World Summit 
Meeting, where the R2P doctrine was universally adopted by all member states in the 
UN.  
Figure 1 in the demographics section of this chapter revealed the deep division 
within the UNSC at the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2012. This figure illustrates the 
division by pointing out the use of ‘veto power’ by Russia and China on matters 
concerning intervention and R2P, after Resolutions 1970 and 1973 invoked the use of 
force in Libya. The chart further showed the polarization between the United States, 
France, and United Kingdom (P3) and Russia and China (P2) based on the use their veto 
power to protect their interests in the Middle East. Unfortunately, this trend has continued 
to impede the UNSC’s ability to invoke or implement the principles of R2P in many of 
the crises that have emerged since Libya. Lopez (2015) indicated that many have 
questioned the wisdom and effectiveness of the intervention. Lopez (2015) further 




the future of R2P, it must address the failures of R2P in Libya (pp. 119-138). Libya was 
the first and only case to achieve a consensus in the UNSC to invoke Chapter 7 measures.  
In When the UNSC fails, the UN fails (GCR2P, 2016), the video begins with the 
inscription that P5 members of the UNSC have the right to veto but with this also comes 
responsibility to provide alternative options. Suggestions were made by the following 
individuals with professional knowledge, experience, and expertise: (a) Mary Robinson, 
Elder, former President of Ireland, and former UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, articulated that the UNSC was setup to be the leader on peace and security, and 
when it fails, the consequences are terrible. (b). Salil Shetty, Secretary-General of 
Amnesty International, explained that the UNSC was created to prevent mass atrocities, 
unfortunately, they have consistently failed the world from Rwanda to Syria. (c). Kofi 
Annan, Chair of the Elders, and former UN Secretary-General, stated: 
That it should be incumbent upon a member state, if it uses a veto, to present an 
alternative. You cannot put down a veto, paralyze operations creating a stalemate 
and not propose a way forward.  When they are divided and cannot agree on a 
resolution, the crisis tends to fester. (GCR2P, 2016, p. 52). 
The data revealed, after the Libyan crisis, that the tone of Russia and China 
changed dramatically in terms of using R2P, particularly Pillar 3 measure (2016) 
suggested that there were different outcomes in the UNSC for Libya and Syria. The 
practical implications of the situation in Libya (i.e., no national/strategic interests by 
China and Russia, no regional support for the Gaddafi regime, etc.) allowed for 
consensus, abstentions by Russia and China, to allow for military intervention. The 




intervention in Libya leading to regime change, the Russians and the Chinese began to 
think of R2P, particularly Pillar 3, as a tool for Western imperialism. Lee and Chan 
(2016) concluded that China and India’s response to the Crisis in Syria was based on the 
history of abuse by Western powers during the ages of imperialism and colonialism (pp. 
180-181). Moreover, to illustrate China’s selective attitude toward Pillar 3, in 2011-2012, 
When the UNSC was debating to invoke Chapter 7 of the UN Charter to endorse military 
intervention in various countries in Africa and the Middle East (Cote d’Ivoire, Libya, 
Mali, and Syria), China acquiesced in all cases except in Syria (Lee & Chan, p. 179). 
After abstaining to vote against intervention in Libya and understanding how NATO 
changed the mission from protecting civilians into regime change, Russia has since made 
every effort to block all UNSC resolutions on Syria that has been put forth by the United 
States and NATO. The following is a summary that Odeyemi (2016) provided on 
Russian/Chinese vetoes at the beginning of the Syrian crisis: 
In October of 2011, Russia and China vetoed a resolution that condemned Syria’s 
crackdown on anti-government forces. In February of 2012, they vetoed a 
resolution proposed by the League of Arab States, supporting a peace plan calling 
for a cease in violence. In July of 2012, Russia/China vetoed a resolution calling 
for Chapter VII measures demanding the Syrian government stop hostilities or 
face sanctions. Finally, in May of 2014, they vetoed a resolution referring the case 
in Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC). (p. 136) 
The data presented by Odeyemi (2016) suggested a trend by the Russians and Chinese—
with the support of India, Brazil, and South Africa—to contest the other permanent 




(Brazil, Russia, India, China, & South Africa) nations were ubiquitous in recent debates 
as a symbolic counterbalance to Western dominance of the international order (p. 128). 
Lopez (2015) cited Genser’s statement that “Western powers made a huge mistake by 
pivoting so rapidly to regime change, which wasn’t justifiable under R2P and wasn’t 
justifiable under the resolution” (pp. 228-229). To date, Russia—with the backing of 
China—has vetoed 14 UNSC resolutions on Syria since the beginning of the conflict. 
Averre and Davies (2015) suggested that the Russians felt that R2P should focus entirely 
on the first two pillars as a means of protecting vulnerable populations. Pillar 3 was 
viewed as a tool for the West to promote democracy and regime change. They ultimately 
concluded, however, that the Russian position was hypocritical when it came to using 
force, as an intervention tool, in Crimea and the Ukraine when it suited their interests. 
Russia has blocked 13 resolutions primarily concerning humanitarian efforts to ease the 
pain and suffering of Syrian civilians. As previously mentioned, Resolutions 2118 and 
2209 were the only resolutions that called for Chapter 7 and Pillar 3 measures to be 
applied in case of continued chemical weapons use/attacks by the Assad regime. Table 1 
illustrates the vetoed resolutions on Syria and the nations who did not support each of 
these resolutions (Russo, 2017). 
Additionally, as seen in Table 2, Russo (2017) enumerated resolutions passed in 
Syria. Many of the resolutions align with Russian interests, backed by China, to try and 
maintain the sovereign integrity of the Assad regime over Syria. This data revealed the 
inconsistencies of the implementation of Pillar 3 in modern related crises. Political 
interests, ideology, and national security concerns have created complex conflicts and 




receive a vote of consensus to use force as an intervention tool. All other crises have 
failed to achieve consensus, because of the use of the veto. Cote d’Ivoire, Libya, Mali, 
Crimea, Ukraine, Myanmar, and Syria all have fallen victim to the UNSC’s failure to 
consistently apply R2P when civilians have the potential to become the victims of mass 
atrocity crimes. The use of the veto has led to a pattern of non-consensus within the 
UNSC to uphold its obligation to maintain international peace and security. Russia’s and 
China’s use of their veto power to stall action has resulted in the continuation of mass 
atrocities, specifically in Syria. The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 
(2020) concluded that:  
Throughout the past nine years the UN Security Council has consistently failed to 
uphold its responsibility to protect the Syrian people. Fourteen vetoes by Russia 
(including eight with China) have undermined international efforts to hold 
perpetrators on all sides accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity 
(p. 1). 
Salil Shetty (2016), Secretary-General of Amnesty International, has called for the P5 
members of the UNSC—particularly the United States, Russian, and China—to stop 
using the veto to protect themselves and focus on protecting civilians who are dying in 
large numbers. Further, he stated that, it is high time that these governments put the 
protection of people over their narrow political interests (GCR2P, 2016, 2.53). Lopez 
(2015) articulated that:  
Ultimately… decisions about intervention will continue to be made in an ad hoc 
fashion by political leaders balancing national interests, legal considerations, 




prior to the advent of R2P. (pp. 119-138) 
The use of the veto has led to R2P being applied inconsistently by the UNSC (P5). Their 
national political and security interests have led those members, particularly the United 
States, Russia, and China, to apply their veto power in a contradictory manner in some 
modern-day crises in parts of Africa and the Middle East. 
 
Research Question 2 
RQ2 asked: Does the application of R2P result in negative outcomes? The theme 
associated with answering this research question was, the failures of R2P after Libya. The 
examination of the data for the Libyan crisis was used to answer this research question. 
Libya was the only case where R2P, specifically Pillar 3, had been applied. Resolution 
1973 was adopted on March 17, 2011, authorizing the use of all measure necessary to 
protect civilians, including establishing a no-fly zone. Ten UNSC members voted on this 
resolution, with five members abstaining. More importantly, there were no votes against 
the resolution by any of the P5 members, and thus consensus was achieved. This allowed 
for Pillar 3 to be implemented for the first time under the UNSC. Lopez (2015) stated that 
the Libyan case remains an anomaly as the only Arab Spring uprising that sparked swift 
action by the international community and led to an armed intervention (p. 3). The UNSC 
has failed to act in any other crisis, meeting the requirements of pillar 3, with forceful 
intervention. 
 Libya was the most frequently used word in this theme. Of the 13 files/nodes, 




times. Syria or Syrian was the next most frequently used word, at 40 times. Nevertheless, 
Libya is the only case where Pillar 3 was legally and legitimately employed to protect 
civilians who were at risk for mass atrocities. Feikes (2017) articulated that the U.S. and 
NATO intervened in Libya in 2011 due to fears of a massacre of innocent civilians in 
Benghazi at the hands of dictator Muammar Gaddafi. Gareth Evans (2002, as cited in 
Lopez 2015), one of the architects of the R2P doctrine, stated that “the campaign in Libya 
has done grave, possibly even irreparable, damage to R2P’s prospects of becoming a 
global norm” (pp. 119-138). The data continued to reveal, through the failure of R2P, 
additional analysis of documents on the effects of R2P in Libya. Peta (2017) suggested 
that R2P is inherently problematic, indicating that states do not intervene to stop/prevent 
human suffering, but rather to achieve a strategic objective. Peta (2017) continued to 
suggest that once a state intervenes and achieves their strategic objective within a 
country, they have no obligation to stay and help rebuild, and thus can leave the country 
in even worse shape than prior to intervention. Peta’s analysis confirms that the 
application of R2P has created some negative outcomes, specifically in Libya as the lone 
case for the implantation of the R2P doctrine (Peta, 2017). 
After the United States and its NATO allies achieved their strategic objective of 
protecting Libyan civilians and then reverting to regime change, under the veil of R2P, 
they abandoned the newly installed government of Libya without the necessary political 
and socio-economic foundations to prevent chaos from returning. Peta (2017) declared 
that in achieving their strategic objective, NATO dismantled Libya’s state apparatus and 
left the country in a more vulnerable position than it was under Gaddafi’s rule. As a result 




that the researcher created from the analysis of experts on R2P and its failures in Libya. 
Table 3 illustrates how each of these individual experts express how the 
application of R2P eventually failed the Libyan people, resulting in negative outcomes, 
which have left Libyan civilians in a worse position than before the R2P mandate. In a 
personal interview, Genser (2012) articulated: 
  
The ethicality of the intervention under R2P extends beyond Gaddafi’s fall to the 
trends in post-war Libya, where there have been few positive developments. Since 
the end of the war in October 2011, Libya has been plagued by economic 
instability, widespread violence and insecurity and threats to political transition 
processes (p. 12). 
 
The application of R2P, specifically Pillar 3, in Libya initially fulfilled its stated 
goals. When those goals were averted into regime change, however, the international 
community—led by those states who are permanent members in the UNSC and NATO 
allies (United States, France, and United Kingdom)—failed to apply what many R2P 
experts are now touting as the fourth pillar; the Responsibility to Rebuild. Duncan 
Pickard, nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and former 
Libya country director for Democracy Reporting International, observed that unlike its 
neighbors, this country had to effectively start from scratch: “Libya had nothing to work 
with – no institutions to draw from, no legal continuity with the past.” (Lopez, 2015, p. 
131). Additionally, Mattia Toaldo of the European Council on Foreign Relations 




to build the legitimacy of institutions and political actors, promote reconciliation among 
former combatants, encourage national dialogue and address the worsening economic 
conditions (Lopez, 2015, p. 131). Nevertheless, the pattern of R2P failures laid out by 
these individual experts has provided detailed evidence of the negative outcomes that 
have befallen Libya, which is the only case, where R2P has been applied by the UNSC.  
Two nodes/codes were created in Nvivo to analyze articles, interviews, and 
videos of experts and their analysis of the impact of R2P in Libya. The themes that were 
analyzed consisted of: (1) the failure of R2P and (2) the inconsistent historical application 
of R2P. Individual analysis of statements by selected experts were highlighted in Nvivo, 
where word clouds and word trees were examined. Table 3, a Summation of R2P and its 
Failures in Libya, was created by the researcher as an illustration, concluding the analysis 
of a few experts on how R2P failed in Libya. 
Research Question 3 
RQ3 asked: Would a historically consistent application of R2P help alleviate the 
crisis in Syria? The theme provided by the data was inaction by the UNSC in Syria from 
2015 to present. Furthermore, the data provided evidence that R2P has not been applied 
consistently since its inception in 2005. While analyzing the data to answer the first 
research question, it was revealed that overall, R2P has not been consistently applied 
through all modern- day crises. The use of the ‘veto’ provided evidence that after Libya, 
the UNSC has failed to reach a consensus to fully apply R2P on any case, particularly 




The BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have used 
their regional influence, as well as the veto powers of Russia and China to foster inaction 
within the UNSC, consequently, resulting in the continuation of pain and suffering for 
Syrian civilians. Lee and Chan (2016) professed that both Russian and China tend to 
reject U.S. liberalism and the advancement of Western ideals of regime change under the 
auspices of democracy in the form of R2P. Averre and Davies (2015) declared that 
Russia prefers the status-quo of the international order, where human rights are secondary 
to the international norm of state rights, lending to the concept that the actions of Russia, 
appear to undermine the basic principles of R2P. These differences in ideology, as it 
pertains to sovereignty, have fueled the complexities over implementing/applying R2P 
(Pillar 3) in Syria. Russo (2017) voiced that the case of Syria has revealed the depth of 
political and ideological differences among UNSC member states related to the 
implementation of R2P’s third pillar, calling into question its effectiveness as an 
international norm.  
After examining the use of pillar 3 measures in Libya, the negative outcomes, 
appear to have affected how the UNSC has engaged the crisis in Syria (Dr. Adams, 2017 
& Lopez 2015). Although there are many similarities between the two cases 
(Libya/Syria), the lessons learned from the post-conflict in Libya, and the apprehension 
of most of the members in the UNSC, except for Russia, to commit resources, 
particularly military, has stagnated R2P’s effectiveness. Feikes (2017) expressed that by 
not deciding to act in Syria, the U.S. and its NATO allies opened the door to a Russian 




has failed to: (a) end indiscriminate air strikes, (b) end the use of illegal weapons, and (c) 
ensure humanitarian access.  
The data further revealed that inaction in Syria was due to a lack “prospects of 
success” (Kildron, 2012 & Odeyemi, 2016). As previously mentioned, there are four 
criteria, additionally put forth by Kildron (2012), that should be present when considering 
military intervention. If these criteria are met, then the chances of the mission being 
successful increase. These conditions were presented but not in Libya and not in Syria. 
Table 4 contains the four criteria for success that were based on the forceful intervention 
in Libya. 
Table 4 explains how Libya met all four criteria and therefore, the chances of a 
military intervention by NATO, should be successful. Kildron (2012) explained that 
military intervention is not a “Panacea for all humanitarian intervention and should only 
be explored in cases with high probability of success” (p. 36). Kildron (2012) also 
concluded that the criteria stated in the Libyan model needed to be in place, to achieve 
the goals of a successful intervention via force. According to the Libyan Model, 
therefore, Syria was not a good case for Pillar 3 measures under the R2P mandate, 
because it does not satisfy any of the four criteria needed for a successful intervention. 
There is no international mandate that allows for the implementation of Pillar 3 under 
Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Russia and China have used their veto power to block all 
resolutions that discussed the use of force within the UNSC, thereby nullifying 
consensus. Barber (2019) stated that the Security Council has not been able to do much 
on Syria. Barber (2019) further suggested that with limited exceptions, the UNSC has 




give effect to its decisions. This political and ideological divide in the UNSC created the 
impossibility of obtaining an international mandate to use R2P, to protect Syrian 
civilians. Barber (2019) also communicates this by declaring that the Security Council 
cannot take meaningful action in any conflict where the interests of an aggressor align 
with those of one of the five permanent members – in other words, most conflicts. 
Bellamy (2014) and Morris (2013) both concluded that the pursuit of narrow national 
interests by the P5 made it impossible to apply R2P in the Syrian case. 
The Syrian crisis seems to have international acknowledgement on the need to 
protect civilians that are suffering from mass atrocities and need humanitarian assistance. 
For the reasons mentioned above, however, a broad coalition supporting intervention to 
protect civilians has been unable to manifest. The division within the UNSC has not 
allowed for a broad coalition to form. Differences in ideology, political will, and 
skepticism after the Libyan crisis has caused inaction in Syria and allowed for the crisis 
to continue. Odeyemi (2016) articulated that when a house is divided, such as the contest 
between the Sino-Russia (P2) alliance and the United States–France–United Kingdom P3 
alliance over R2P intervention in Syria, that division within the UNSC, leaves civilians 
who are at-risk for mass atrocity crimes, un-protected, as are Syrian civilians in this case 
(p. 122). Topal (2013) continued along this theme of inaction by declaring that Security 
Council could not—and does not have the ability to take action, due to the opposition of 
China, and especially Russia. Topal (2013) further cites that the lack of shared political 
decisiveness among member states result in the UN possessing an unsustainable structure 




along with the regional influence of India, Brazil, and South Africa (BRICS), have not 
allowed for the formation of a broad coalition under the criteria of the Libyan Model.  
The third factor in the Libyan Model, regional support, was also revealed in the 
data to be another missing part in the prospects of success criteria. The data has shown 
that there is no regional support to implement R2P in Syria. Iran has a vested interest, 
along with Russia, in keeping Assad in power. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, U.S and 
Israel, would like to see Assad driven from power. Dragovic and Iron (2017) declared 
that regional powers such as Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia “have a vested interest in 
influencing the postwar settlement to their own advantage” (p. 67). The Arab league has 
not been able to declare its support for any group in Syria, thus providing further proof of 
regional support being non-existent. Vanhullebusch (2015) suggested that in the present 
Syrian crisis, member states of the Arab League are equally trying to profile themselves 
when supporting one or the other rebel factions fighting the Syrian government and 
paramilitary forces. The data concludes that regional support in the Syrian case has not 
been identified, due to multiple actors with varying interests, either for or against the 
Assad Regime. 
The final criteria stated in the Libyan model calls for a credible opposition force 
on the ground in Syria, where a coalition would not have to employ their own ground 
forces to ensure success, however, the examination of the Syrian Crisis showed that there 
were too many actors on the ground in Syria, pursuing their own interests. These actors 
included: Russia, Turkey, forces loyal to Assad, Iran, Hezbollah, Gulf States, Syrian 
Democratic Forces, the Kurds, ISISL, and Jordan. Feikes (2017) stated that all have had 




that Syria has evolved into a protracted civil war and the center of the largest refugee 
crisis in the post-World War II era. The situation in Syria has prompted Dr. Simon 
Adams (2020) to declare that “Not since the peak of the Cold War has the UN Security 
Council appeared so bitterly divided and incapable of decisive action” (p. 1). 
Summary 
In summary, when answering the research question of whether a historically 
consistent application of R2P help alleviate the crisis in Syria, the data revealed that 
Libya is the only official case to employ R2P. The Libyan model sets forth criteria for 
other situations to be successful, particularly when intervening forcefully. Syria does not 
satisfy any of the stated criteria for reasonable prospect of success. Dragovic and Iron 
(2017) concluded that the only way to achieve lasting peace in Syria is to establish new 
states where the people have common interests and purposes based on their cultural 
characteristics.  
The first research question (RQ1) asked: Is R2P applied consistently across all 
modern crisis-related human endeavors? The theme that emerged from the data was the 
constant use of veto power to nullify the consistent application of R2P across all modern 
crisis related human endeavors. Data from experts, tables, and charts were used to 
demonstrate how members of the P5 in the UNSC used their veto to prevent or stop the 
implementation of R2P principles. Thereby, allowing for inconsistencies to emerge from 
the initial case of R2P being implemented in Libya and not in Syria despite numerous 
similarities.  
The second research question (RQ2) asked: Does the application of R2P result in 




the failure of R2P after the Libya Model. The data revealed, after an exhaustive 
examination of the mistakes made in Libya after using force, that negative outcomes 
plagued the nation, despite the strategic objectives being met. Leaving a void where some 
experts and nation-states perceived Libyan civilians as being worst off than before the 
intervention. The initial objective of protecting civilians, quickly turned into regime 
change. This change prompted concern from Russia and China, who now viewed R2P as 
an instrument of the West to advance their national and political interests. This situation 
also sets the tone for future battles in the UNSC over the implementation and application 
of R2P to future crises.  
The third research question (RQ3) asked: Would a historically consistent 
application of R2P help alleviate the crisis in Syria? The theme of inaction by the UNSC 
in Syria emerged to answer this question. The Libyan model was used to determine the 
prospect of success. The criteria set forth in this model was applied to other crises to 
determine whether the UNSC would be successful in Syria when applying R2P. The data 
revealed that Syria did not possess the four requirements to have a successful intervention 
force. There was no international mandate, no broad coalition in support of intervention, 
no regional support from the Arab league of states or the African Union, and finally, no 
credible ground/oppositional force. Syria has many nations involved on the ground, each 
serving their own political, economic, and strategic interests, ultimately, creating an 
atmosphere of division within the UNSC, resulting in inaction based on the criteria set 
forth in the Libyan Model. 
In the next chapter, the researcher discusses the interpretation of the findings. This 




R2P, and the implications for positive social change that R2P can have on populations at 





Chapter 5: Discussions, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to positively impact social change 
by examining the implementation of Pillar 3 by the UNSC in a crisis-related situation 
such as Syria. This goal was vital to examine, given that Syria has seen mass atrocities 
continue and it also continues to disrupt peace and security within the international arena. 
The nature of this study was a qualitative methodology and a case study design. The 
researcher examined multiple perspectives from multiple secondary sources on the R2P 
doctrine, thereby utilizing triangulation to improve the trustworthiness of the study. The 
researcher collected the data using a purposeful sampling approach and employed a 
criterion-focused sampling strategy to answer the research questions based on the 
secondary data. The data collection involved the analysis of the voting patterns/behavior 
of the five permanent members of the UNSC who possessed veto power. This was done 
by examining UNSC resolutions on Syria from 2015 to 2020. The researcher analyzed 
information-rich interviews and testimonies of experts on the R2P doctrine, along with 
documents and publications from the NGOs mentioned throughout this study. The study 
was conducted to address the identified gap in the literature and to expand on the policy 
or policies that guide the UNSC’s decision-making process on using force to stop future 
mass atrocities (i.e., the implementation of Pillar 3). 
As a result of the analysis of the secondary data for this research study, the 
researcher validated the findings of those results involving R2P and the complexities of 
implementing/applying Pillar 3 to the Syrian crisis. The UNSC has been regulated to 
stalemate status, as Russia and China have used their veto power to block any resolutions 




application of R2P across all modern-day related crisis—has allowed the continuation of 
mass atrocities in Syria to persist. Figure 3 illustrates how the United States, Russia, and 
China have used their veto power since 2011.  
Figure 3 
Use of the Veto by UNSC Members Since 2011 
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Figure 3 illustrates that the use of the veto by Russia and China has risen considerably 
since 2011, with the conflict in Syria accounting for the bulk of these. Since 2011, Russia 
has cast 19 vetoes, 14 of which were on Syria. Eight of the nine Chinese vetoes during 
this period were regarding Syria, and one was on Venezuela. The remaining Russian 
vetoes since 2011 were against two resolutions related to the conflict in Ukraine, one on 
the 20th anniversary of the genocide in Srebrenica, one on sanctions against Yemen, and 
one on Venezuela. The United States has cast three vetoes since 2011, all of them 
regarding Israel/Palestine issues. France and the United Kingdom, not shown on the 
chart, have not vetoed any resolutions on Syria during this period (2011 to present). 
This study also produced important findings about R2P and the effects that the 
application of the doctrine has had on emerging nation-states (BRICS) and their 
motivation for blocking UNSC action on Syria, based on their shared experiences with 
the implementation of R2P in Libya by the United States and its NATO allies. One of the 
primary motivations of China, along with India, was the abuse of Western nation-states 
during the ages of imperialism and colonialism (Lee & Chan, 2016). Additionally, these 
two nation-states tended to still lean toward a state-centered ideology of sovereignty and 
were skeptical of R2P being used by the West as a form of regime change. Russia held a 
similar position, believing that R2P should focus entirely on the first two pillars, while 
suggesting that implementing Pillar 3 should only be done as a matter of self-defense. 
Contrary to their beliefs on implementing R2P in Syria, however, Russia and China have 
different opinions on the use of force in other crises. China has consented to using force 
in Cote d’Ivoire, Libya, and Mali, while Russia has consented to the use of force in Libya 




investigation generated findings on the negative effects R2P had in Libya, where after the 
initial objectives of protecting Libyan civilians were modified into regime change, the 
people of Libya were deemed to be in a worst position than before the intervention. The 
final findings from the data reflected reasons for inaction by the UNSC in Syria. These 
inactions revolved around the notion of “reasonable prospects of success” and national 
political and strategic interests.  
Interpretation of the Findings 
Regarding the research questions, the findings within this research study mostly 
support the current literature on R2P, particularly implementing Pillar 3. Patton (2015) 
declared that “Qualitative interpretations begins with elucidating meanings [while] 
Interpretation involves going beyond the descriptive and attaching significance to what 
was found” (p. 570). The three research questions shaped the procedures of this study, 
including the data collection, analysis, and interpretation procedures that the researcher 
used to answer these questions.  
The first research question of this study focused on whether R2P has been 
consistently applied to all modern crisis-related human endeavors. The theme that 
emerged from the data was the constant use of the veto by the permanent members of the 
UNSC. The findings related to this theme confirmed what the current literature has 
suggested. The implementation or application of R2P, especially Pillar 3, is a complex 
undertaking due to the national interests of the permanent members (P5) in the UNSC. 
The results confirmed the deep political and ideological divide within the UNSC, which 
has been delegated authority to exercise Pillar 3 measures, where the use of the veto 




division to a semantic game with life-or-death consequences. Additionally, Grover 
suggested that “those who are human rights advocates need to play this game more 
skillfully to save civilian lives” (2015, p. 1112). The interpretation of this statement is 
that individuals and organizations, such as the NGOs mentioned throughout this study, 
continue to examine, and develop policy that addresses mass atrocities, but have 
alternative ways of implementing or applying R2P, other than, exclusively through the 
UNSC. Dr. Simon Adams (2015) called this “institutionalizing the norm” (p. 3). In his 
interview with STAIR, Adams discussed how the GCR2P is currently working/training 
with African military and police leaders on protecting civilians and their human rights, 
stating, “Every day we are trying to learn lessons from Central African Republic or South 
Sudan, Nigeria, or Syria and improve the implementation of R2P” (p. 3). 
After UNSC implemented Pillar 3 in Libya, Russia and China used their veto 
power to further their national interest, and to put a check on what they perceive as the 
West expanding their influence in the same manner as during imperialism and 
colonialism. Most of their vetoes have come on Syrian resolutions, contesting any U.S.-, 
French-, or UK-led resolutions calling for the use of force. Russia continues to use its 
veto to protect the Assad government from any resolutions that rebuke his violent 
treatment of civilians, including the use of Chemical weapons. The GCR2P (2020) stated 
that since the launch of their military offensive in 2019, the Idlib campaign has been an 
exercise in organized cruelty as Syrian ground forces and Russian airstrikes have 
deliberately targeted schools, markets, hospitals, and displacement centers to terrorize the 
civilian population. In pursuing their national interests, the Russians are committed to 




use their veto to block resolutions suggesting individual sovereignty based on human 
rights. China has followed the same premise as the Russians, using their veto eight times 
in alignment with Russia on Syrian resolutions. National interests did not seem to 
motivate the Chinese in Syria as much as the Russians, but a long history of 
colonializations has caused skepticism, along with an ideology that their countries’ past 
poverty, underdevelopment, social disorder, and violence can be attributed to colonial 
exploitation and encroachment (P. K. Lee & Chan, 2016). 
The use of veto by these two nations on R2P-related crises is their way of 
protecting their national strategic interests and maintaining checks on the West—led by 
the United States—from increasing their influence on smaller, weaker nations. Topal 
(2013) confirmed this by suggesting that: 
Security Council could not, and does not have the ability to, take action due to the 
opposition of China and especially Russia. This picture painfully reveals that the 
problems of disproportionate representation, the granting of veto power to a 
limited number of member states, and the lack of shared political decisiveness 
among member states result in the UN possessing an unsustainable structure 
incompatible with the conditions of our times. (p. 2) 
The use of the veto has been confirmed by modern researchers to hinder the consistent 
application of R2P across all modern crisis-related human endeavors. 
The second research question focused on R2P and negative outcomes when it is 
applied to a crisis. The theme that emerged focused on the only case where R2P has been 
applied and met all the criteria to use force as an intervention tool. The 2011 case of 




of consensus was achieved to apply Chapter 7 measures in the form of Pillar 3 of the R2P 
doctrine. Led by the United States, a multilateral force implemented strategic objectives 
to take ‘all necessary measures’ to protect Libyan civilians, including a no fly-zone, 
freezing assets, and an arms embargo. After examining the data and analyzing the results, 
the researcher concluded that it was not only confirmed, but that knowledge was 
extended as well, reinforcing the suggestions of previous scholars. Some experts have 
agreed that mistakes were made in Libya, as well as regrets to foreign policy decisions 
(i.e., R2P) that led to instability and eventual regime change (Adams, 2015; Peta, 2017; 
Rieff, 2011).  
Libya was left in a state of chaos after the initial objectives of protecting Libyan 
civilians turned into regime change. Dr. Simon Adams (GCR2P, 2017) declared his 
criticism of the application of R2P in Libya, positing that the mandate had been 
overstretched. Genser’s (2012) statement can be interpreted as declaring the international 
community has an ethical responsibility to rebuild and abdicating this responsibility has 
left Libya in chaos due to economic, social, and political instability. Due to the negative 
outcomes resulting from the use of force, Libya was essentially starting over, where there 
were no legal or legitimate institutions remaining. After overseeing the regime change 
following Gaddafi’s death, the United States and its allies left the area, leaving the ITNC 
to deal with the aftermath (Genser, 2012). These findings suggest that there should have 
been a commitment by the international community to help rebuild, while maintaining 
peace and security; however, the transition after the intervention was deemed limited. 
There have been murmurings that R2P fell short amongst R2P scholars and a certain 




have suggested that should have been a post-conflict effort by the international 
community to stay and help rebuild Libya, in terms of re-establishing socio-economic 
institutions, promoting peace and restoring relations among combatants. Additionally, 
addressing the deteriorating economic and political conditions. These individuals have 
called for a fourth pillar being applied to the R2P doctrine: The Responsibility to Rebuild 
(Adams, 2015; Friedman, 2015; Lopez, 2015). 
In summary, the application of R2P in Libya—being the only case on record—has 
resulted in negative outcomes that have left Libya in a perpetual state of chaos. Tharoor 
(2020) declared that “Libya has become a global scramble for power and prestige in a 
multisided chess match” (para. 1). The failures/negative outcomes of R2P in Libya have 
led to civil war and further de-stabilization in the region. Currently, two of the permanent 
members of the UNSC (France and Russia), along with various regional nation-states, are 
fighting for control in Libya. This will only extend the pain and suffering of Libyan 
civilians, resulting in what Tharoor (2020) termed “the Syrianization of Libya” (para. 
12). Nine years after the adoption of Resolution 1973, authorizing the use of force under 
the R2P doctrine, Libyan civilians are in a worse position than before the intervention. 
The final research question of this study, research question three, focused on 
Syria, and if R2P had a history of being applied consistently, would this have help to 
alleviate this crisis. The theme that the data revealed was inaction by the UNSC. The 
findings revealed that there is an emerging group of nations (BRICS)—primarily Russia, 
China, and India—that are using their regional influence, coupled with the veto power of 
Russia and China, to foster inaction within the UNSC. Their ideological beliefs on 




The effects of colonialism, imperialism, liberalism, and regime change, as well as the 
belief that the West uses R2P to advance this notion, have impacted their view of the R2P 
doctrine (Averre & Davies, 2015; P. K. Lee & Chan, 2016; Russo, 2017). For these 
nations, sovereignty is still state-centered, and force should only be taken for self-defense 
purposes. This state-centered approach, along with their skepticism of R2P, particularly 
Pillar 3, after Libya, has created a divide in the UNSC on Syria, where achieving 
consensus is not a viable option, and further creates stagnation (Coen, 2015).  
The data revealed that failures in Libya have allowed Russia to block any 
consensus to take collective forceful action in Syria, and that sanctions the Assad regime 
for using force against civilians. By not taking action, the UNSC opened the door for 
Russia to intervene militarily on behalf of Assad. No action was taken to prevent/stop air 
strikes against civilians, to stop/prevent the flow of illegal weapons, or to ensure access to 
humanitarian aid (Feikes, 2017). The acquiescence to Russian influence in Syria by the 
P3 (United States, France, and United Kingdom) have decreased possibilities of R2P 
having success on any level. Kildron (2012) compared Syria to Libya and applied the 
Libyan model based on the four requirements for R2P to be successful, determining that 
Syria was not a good candidate for R2P. Libya had distinct differences from Syria, in 
terms of waging a successful military campaign (Table 4). Furthermore, Syria presented 
the UNSC with more complexities when considering applying R2P. Factors including 
Russian unilateralism, no credible opposing force against Assad, and mass atrocities 
being committed on all sides have contributed to inaction by the UNSC (Odeyemi, 2016). 
Also, China has approached intervention under R2P as a continuation of Western 




United States, would infringe on sovereignty, and threaten weaker states into regime 
change. P. K. Lee and Chan (2016) suggested there are three reasons for China’s dissent 
on R2P: (a) colonialism, (b) strong versus weak states, and (c) the UNSC primarily 
consists of Western powers. Although it appears that China has no strategic interests in 
Syria (Kildron, 2012), they have voted with Russia on Syrian matters in the UNSC eight 
times.  
On the other hand, Russia’s and China’s approach to R2P in Syria is contradictory 
to other crises, where their national strategic interests vary. Their military interventions in 
Ukraine and Crimea are contradictory to their rhetoric in Syria. The Russians claim that 
R2P should focus entirely on the first two pillars as a means of protecting vulnerable 
populations. In addition, Pillar 3 is viewed as a tool for the West to promote democracy 
and regime change. In the Ukraine and Crimea, they have unilaterally intervened using 
force (Averre & Davies, 2015). China has promoted the application of R2P in Africa but 
refused to do so in Syria. The multi-layered complexities that are present in Syria confirm 
the current scholarly conclusions that there is not a reasonable prospect of success. Syria 
does not meet the four criteria of the Libyan model. These re-emerging powers (BRICS) 
and their belief in the reasonable prospects’ criterion will be counted on to advance R2P 
in Syria (see Odeyemi, 2016). 
Theoretical Framework Implications 
The R2P is a relatively new concept, and the implications of the findings indicate 
that future research is needed on the implementation or application of the doctrine to 
current crisis and those that may occur in the future. Adams (2015) declared the failure of 




still need further developing, to address the challenges that still lie ahead. The 
Responsibility to Protect is an accepted norm in the international community, every 
member state of the UN voted in favor of the doctrine in 2005; however, there is a 
preponderance of evidence in the research implying that the conflict exists over 
implementation/application. Adams further posited that there is not a single state in the 
UN that would say they disagree with R2P. He says that they have won the “abstract of 
ideas;” therefore, the remaining debate is on implementation (Adams, 2015, p. 12). 
The failure of R2P will continue to revolve around implementation. This 
framework emphasizes the first two pillars, and the third pillar is a last resort option. 
Nevertheless, as emerging crises in Syria, Libya, and other parts of Africa and Asia 
continue to disrupt international peace and security, the debate around implementation 
will continue to produce inaction. In all these cases, there is nowhere that falls outside the 
realm of R2P. It is just a question of figuring out what the crime is, who is perpetrating it 
or is at imminent risk of perpetrating it, and how it should be stopped (Adams, 2015). 
Limitations of the Study 
To understand the limitations of this study, the researcher began with identifying 
his predispositions and biases while collecting and interpreting the data (Patton, 2015). 
Other limitations were due to the high volume of secondary data, resulting in the analysis 
being extremely time-consuming. Patton (2015) declared that “limited resources, time, 
and complexities of the real world do not yield easily to our design parameters” (p. 244). 
The complexities of implementing Pillar 3 under the R2P doctrine limited the actions 
taken by the UNSC to prevent or stop mass atrocities, not only in Syria, but in most 




The scope of the research was limited to role of the UNSC and its inability to 
obtain a consensus to apply Pillar 3 measures in Syria. Additionally, this study further 
limited by the using only one case (Libya) where Pillar 3 was implemented, to compare 
to their actions in Syria. The current findings, therefore, may not be generalizable or 
transferrable to other crises without further study. The findings also lack generalizability 
due to the complexities of achieving consensus within the UNSC, based on the 
differences of national strategic interests and political ideology of the P5.  
Recommendations 
Considering the results of this study, the researcher has determined that a few 
recommendations are necessary. First, the researcher explored the 
implementation/application of Pillar 3 through the UNSC, the only entity that is currently 
given the authority to implement the use of force as an intervention tool, finding that 
inaction due to complexities led to the abdication of their responsibility to maintain peace 
and security, according to the principles of the UN Charter. Future research efforts, 
therefore, should involve the examination of alternative organizations that could 
apply/implement Pillar 3 measures to stop/prevent mass atrocities. Regional 
organizations and the UN General Assembly should be examined as those alternatives. 
Barber (2019) claimed that the Security Council is not the only organ in the UN system 
with responsibility for international peace and security. The General Assembly has a 
secondary responsibility for international peace and security and has committed to acting 
on it when the Security Council fails. This was not present when examining the current 
body of literature. Regional organizations and coalitions of the willing were mentioned in 




Second, the researcher focused only on Pillar 3, where the assumption was, that if 
Pillar 3 was on the table, then the first two pillars had not been met by the state in 
question. Therefore, transferring that responsibility to the international community. 
Future research should expand on the R2P doctrine to include adding a fourth pillar, the 
responsibility to Rebuild (Adams, 2015; Dragovic & Iron, 2017; Vanhullebusch, 2015). 
Rebuilding would focus on the necessary social, economic, and political measures needed 
for a recovery that seeks to prevent the recurrence of mass atrocities. 
Finally, future researchers should look to expand the ACT Code of Conduct, 
where 112 nations have signed this draft resolution, calling for the UNSC permanent 
members to withhold the use of their veto power against a credible draft resolution that is 
intended to stop or prevent mass atrocities and to take timely and decisive action 
(GCR2P, 2017). Only two of the permanent members in the UNSC have signed the 
mandate (France and United Kingdom); the United States, Russia, and China have yet to 
comply. Additionally, these three members have utilized their veto power regarding the 
most concerning issues in the Middle East. The signatories of the Code of Conduct 
further declare that “voting to block action to prevent mass atrocities is an affront to our 
common humanity” (GCR2P, 2015). It is recommended, therefore, that future researchers 
target the expansion of this mandate to those remaining P5 members, as well as the 
remaining 83 General Assembly members who have yet to sign. The France/Mexican 
Initiative also calls for the suspension of the veto by the P5 in cases of mass atrocities. 
This declaration focuses only on the P5 members, but 103 member states already support 





Positive Social Change Implications 
The current findings reflected difficulties with implementing or applying R2P to 
modern-day crises, particularly in Syria. The researcher’s recommendations and other 
actions could facilitate positive social change by confirming the literature on the 
complexities of implementing Pillar 3, as well as, by adding knowledge through 
procedure on how to implement or apply R2P in crisis related situations, when the UNSC 
fails to act. The UNSC is currently the sole authorized entity allowed to implement or 
apply the use of force to maintain peace and security within the international community. 
Crises that put civilians at risk for mass atrocities, infringements of their human dignity, 
and violations of their fundamental human rights are associated with failed states, 
according to the principles of R2P. 
The implications of this study suggest that positive social change should not be 
dependent on one particular entity (i.e., UNSC). There is a demonstrable history of 
inaction by the UNSC when force is needed as an intervention tool to prevent/stop mass 
atrocities. When other governmental entities, including the UN General Assembly, 
regional organizations, and coalitions of the willing, in addition to non-governmental 
organizations, realize the complexities within the UNSC have created a division that 
more than likely leads to inaction, then alternative policy measures should be instituted to 
give authorization to implement or apply Pillar 3 to regional states or coalitions of the 
willing under the direction of the UN General Assembly. Non-governmental 




a successful transition of authorization is crucial to implementing Pillar 3 where civilians 
are at risk for mass atrocities, mass displacement, or mass migration, resulting in a 
continuation of loss of human life and dignity.  
 As previously mentioned in Chapter 1, the overall positive social impact would 
allow victims of mass atrocities the opportunity to seek safe havens, where they would 
receive medical supplies, food, water, and shelter. Furthermore, establishing safe havens 
would be beneficial to neighbor states, where mass migration has had a negative impact 
on these states’ economic, political, and environmental well-being.  
Methodological and Theoretical Implications 
The methodological and theoretical implications of researching the 
implementation of Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine, has inferred the need for future research. 
The findings have suggested the follow up on the ACT Conduct code and the 
French/Mexican initiative on veto restraint. In his interview with STAIR, Dr. Adams 
(2015) claimed that these two important initiatives are directly related to the failures of 
the UNSC in Syria. The assessment of the development and impact of veto restraint could 
be observed on a case-by-case basis, while NGOs could persistently engage UN member 
states on R2P policy and training, as Dr. Adams (2015) indicated: 
The framework is useful, as it places the emphasis on the preventive aspect of 
R2P, where “institutionalizing the norm,” involves advocacy with the UNSC on 
crisis situations, providing advice on policy, and bilateral support for 




This researcher recommends, therefore, that future scholars should continue to study the 
impact of veto restraint in crisis related situations, and the implementation of Pillar 3 
measures by alternative means to understand and improve the responses by the 
international community. The continued existence of inaction by the UNSC, based on the 
findings in this study, will impact the future of R2P, specifically in crisis-related 
situations where all diplomatic means have been exhausted. 
Conclusions 
In this qualitative case study, the researcher examined/analyzed the R2P doctrine, 
specifically the implementation of Pillar 3, in the context of Syria. This crisis met all the 
requirements of the R2P doctrine to classify Syria as a failed state. There were brief 
comparisons between the Libyan case and the Syrian case to assess the implementation of 
R2P, using force, because Libya is the only case on record, where the UNSC achieved 
consensus to use force as a tool for protecting civilians against mass atrocities. 
Secondary data were used as the primary source for collecting data. Multiples 
sources were used to obtain voting records, video interviews, documented interviews, 
conferences, meetings, videos, documents, charts, tables, and other digital resources. The 
researcher used this wealth of information-rich data to understand the complexities 
associated with implementing R2P in a crisis such as Syria. The findings confirmed that 
R2P has not been consistently applied across all modern crisis-related human endeavors. 
Permanent members, specifically Russia and China, have used their veto power to 
prevent proposed resolutions from implementing R2P measures in Syria, but have 
selectively allowed R2P to be used in other crises. Additionally, the application of R2P in 




mistakes made in Libya have left civilians worse off today than they were 9 years ago 
after the implementation of Resolution 1973. Lastly, current researchers have affirmed 
that a historically consistent application of R2P would not have helped to alleviate the 
crisis in Syria. Syria presented the most complexities of any of the crises examined in this 
study. Syria did not meet the criteria presented in the Libyan model, outlining the 
reasonable prospects for conducting a successful intervention, based on Pillar 3 of the 
R2P doctrine. 
As previously mentioned in Chapter 1, the emergent doctrine of R2P serves as a 
guideline for the international community to address mass atrocities. Universally adopted 
at the 2005 World Summit Meeting, R2P has three pillars that define the responsibilities 
for protecting the civilian populations of nation-states. The UNSC is the sole entity that is 
authorized to use forceful measures to protect civilians, if a state manifestly fails to keep 
their citizens safe and secure from mass atrocity crimes. In Chapter 2, the researcher 
detailed relevant literature that addressed the principles of the R2P doctrine, and how 
sovereignty (i.e., state-centered versus individual-centered) inferred the complexities 
associated with implementing Pillar 3 to address mass atrocity crises, particularly in 
Syria. In Chapter 3, the researcher outlined the methodology and design used to answer 
the three research questions. Chapter 4 included the analysis of the data and the findings 
from the data. Finally, in Chapter 5, the researcher discussed the interpretations, 
implications, and recommendations for future research to examine new policies and 
procedures that are necessary to prevent the use of the veto by P5 members in the UNSC/ 




application of R2P, resulting in inaction and negative outcomes when addressing mass 
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Appendix A: Tables 
Table 1 
Vetoed Security Council Resolutions Related to Syria 
Date Agenda Item Against Abstentions 
November 17, 
2017 
Renew mandate of JIM for 30 
days 
Russia, Bolivia China 
November 16, 
2017 
• Condemns use of chemical 
weapons by Syrian Army. 
• Taking note of JIM findings 
• Renew mandate of JIM for 12 
months 
Russia, Bolivia China, Egypt 
October 24, 
2017 
Renew mandate of JIM for period 
of 1 year 
Russia, Bolivia China, 
Kazakhsta
n 
April 12, 2017 • Condemns use of chemical 
weapons. 
• Access to the OPCW FFM and 
JIM to all relevant information to 
investigate attacks 





• Acknowledges findings of JIM 
report; use of chemical weapons 
by the Syrian Armed Forces and 
ISIL 
• Calls for Tribunal to prosecute 
guilty parties. 









• Ceasefire (excluding attacks 
against ISIL). 





October 8, 2016 • Demands end to aerial 
bombardments of and military 
flights over Aleppo. 
• Unimpeded humanitarianism 
access, including by observing 






May 22, 2014 • Refers situation in Syria to the 
ICC 
Russia, China None 
July 19, 2012 • Renewal of UNSMIS under 
Chapter VII 
• Condemns violations of human 
rights Syrian authorities. 
• All parties commit to cessation of 
hostilities and implementation of 
six-point plan 




• Condemns Violence against 
civilians carried out by Syrian 
authorities. 
• Supports League of Arab States’ 
decision to facilitate Syrian-led 
political transition. 
• Calls upon Syrian authorities to 
allow safe and unhindered access 
for humanitarian assistance 
Russia, China None 
October 4, 2011 • Condemns use of force by Syrian 
authorities against civilians. 
• Allow unhindered humanitarian 
access. 
• Inclusive Syrian-led political 
process 
• Calls on states to exercise 
restraint in sale of arms to Syria. 
• Considers options under Article 




Passed Security Council Resolutions Related to Syria 













Bolivia, China, Russia 

















will decide the 
future of Syria 
None 
December 19, 2016 S/RES/2328 • Unhindered 














November 17, 2016 S/RES/2319 • Extends 
mandate of JIM 
for 1 year 
None 
October 31, 2016 S/RES/2314 • Extends 
mandate of JIM 
for 18 days 
None 









December 22, 2015 S/RES/2258 • Renews (for 12 
months) 2014 
decision to 
allow passage of 
aid into the 
country 
None 












August 7, 2015 S/RES/2235 • Condemns the 












OPCW JIM to 
investigate 
March 6, 2015 S/RES/2209 • Condemns use 
of chlorine gas 
weapon. 
• Threatens to 
take Chapter 









































further steps in 
case of non-
compliance 












July 20, 2012 S/RES/2059 • Renews 
mandate of 
Syria Observer 
Mission for 30 
days 
None 










April 14, 2012 S/RES/2042 • Authorizes 
advance team to 
monitor 














Summation of R2P and its Failures in Libya 
 
Expert analysis on R2P in Libya 
Conclusions on the failures of R2P in 
Libya 
Dr. Simon Adams: Executive Director 
(GCR2P) 
2017 Interview with Natasha Hosford 
(STAIRS) St. Anthony’s International 
Review  
There will be defeats, setbacks, and 
mistakes. As for the specifics of 
Libya, I was fiercely critical of 
the way some states 
overstretched the R2P mandate 
in Libya (pp. 7-14). 
Thomas Friedman in an interview with Giselle 
Lopez (2015) 
Thomas Friedman, President Obama 
claimed that one of his biggest 
regrets with regard to foreign 
policy is his lack of foresight 
with the Libyan intervention:  
“I think we underestimated… the need 
to come in full force… the day 
after Gaddafi is gone… at that 
moment, there has to be a much 
more aggressive effort to rebuild 
[a society] that didn’t have any 
civic traditions.” (p. 121). 
 
 
Lopez (2015) claims in the article 
‘Responsibility to Protect at a 
Crossroads: The Crisis in Libya 
explores the context in which the 
decision was made to intervene 
in Libya, the nature of the 
intervention and the instability 
that has followed the fall of the 
Gaddafi regime (p. 122). 
 
Table 4 
Four Criteria for Success to use Force as an Intervention Tool (Libyan Model; Kildron, 
2012) 
 
Criteria for success 





An international Mandate Resolution 1973 gave authorization 
to the UNSC to use force 
under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. Consensus was 
achieved in the UNSC: ten 
for, zero against, five 
abstentions. 
A broad coalition to protect civilians There was a Multinational coalition 
led by the U.S. African 
Command and included 
France, Italy, Great Britain, 
and surrounding Arab 
nations. 
Regional Support Jordan, Qatar, and Kuwait each lent 
support to the no-fly zone 
with military aircraft, 
providing additional regional 
legitimacy to the coalition's 
mission 
A credible opposition force that already has a 
ground game. 
Interim Transitional National 
Council (ITNC), recognized 
by NATO, maintained a 
credible ground force with a 
geographically defendable 
position, provided air power 
a definable objective and a 
visible force to support from 
the air. 
 
 
